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Moral epistemology  
Wittgenstein 
 
Abstract: This book symposium comprises a précis of Nuno 
Venturinha’s Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist 
Epistemology (Springer, 2018) together with four critical 
commentaries on different aspects of the book by Marcelo 
Carvalho, João Vergílio Gallerani Cuter, Marcos Silva and Darlei 
Dall’Agnol, and the author’s replies.  
 
 
Nuno Venturinha - Epistemic Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive 
Invariantism and Insensitive Invariantism: Anything Else? 
 
This paper aims to provide an overall picture of what lies 
at the heart of my book Description of Situations: An Essay in 
Contextualist Epistemology (2018) although the examination 
ranges even further afield. Section 1 contrasts epistemic 
contextualism with what I call context-sensitive objectivism 
(CSO). Section 2 discusses a major strand of thought in 
contemporary epistemology that also reacts against 
traditional contextualism: subject-sensitive invariantism. 
Finally, section 3 explores insensitive invariantism, including 
Williamson’s anti-sceptical version of the latter. I argue that 
CSO has considerable advantages over each of them. 
 
 
1. EPISTEMIC CONTEXTUALISM 
 
Epistemic Contextualism (henceforth EC) is standardly 
taken to be concerned with knowledge attributions and to 
have as its main feature the indexicality of “know”. 
Traditional EC theorists seek to explain this predicate in 
terms of the same semantic factors that account for our use 
of gradable adjectives which, given their vagueness, can be 
modified by intensifiers and downtoners. For example, to 
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talk about a cycle route as being “long” is evidently vague. If 
you are just an occasional cyclist, 50 miles may look like a very 
long ride, but someone well-trained could say instead that it 
is a fairly long distance. Similarly, the idea is to regard 
sentences of the form “S knows that p” as obeying to 
different epistemic standards that are made salient in the 
conversational context. These standards can be higher or 
lower, that is, more or less epistemically demanding, and will 
determine in each case what counts as “knowledge”—a 
totally relative concept from the contextualist point of view. 
According to Stewart Cohen, the earliest major proponent 
of EC,1 “one speaker may attribute knowledge to a subject 
while another speaker denies knowledge to that same 
subject, without contradiction” (1987, 3; 1988, 97). Keith 
DeRose, another leading EC theorist, considers that “[t]his 
lack of contradiction is the key to the sense in which the 
knowledge attributor and the knowledge denier mean 
something different by ‘know’” (1992, 920). But to what 
extent can it be legitimately argued that there is no 
contradiction? In Description of Situations (2018, ch. 1) I claim 
that the contradiction is unavoidable if a strong conception 
of knowledge is assumed. EC, of course, is directed exactly 
against such a conception putting virtually all the emphasis 
on the rules that govern our practical reasoning. As Patrick 
Rysiew emphasizes, “in itself, EC is silent about knowledge” 
(2011, 111, fn. 1). However, if EC is also committed, as its 
proponents forcefully defend, to eradicating radical 
                                                     
1 David Lewis’ 1979 “Scorekeeping in a Language Game” was 
undoubtedly a forerunner of EC but it would take him several years 
to offer a comprehensive account as found in his 1996 “Elusive 
Knowledge” (see Lewis 1983 and 1999).  
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scepticism,2 then critics like Richard Feldman (1999, 2001, 
2004) and Crispin Wright (2005) are right in stressing that a 
relativist account of “know” leaves the sceptical challenge 
untouched. The argument that radical scepticism will only 
arise in high-standards contexts but not in low-standards, 
ordinary ones looks much more like an inadmissible 
capitulation to the sceptic, who is perfectly happy to make 
demands that are exceedingly difficult to meet, than like a 
proper solution to the problem.   
Let me illustrate some of these worries with an example. 
Ralph has been a rock fisherman his whole life and he is used 
to observing the phases of the moon to predict high and low 
tides. For someone as experienced as him, tide charts are 
almost unnecessary. Ralph knows that spring tides occur 
during the full and new moons, and he always gets his best 
catches when the tide is rising. But is it licit to say that he 
really knows it? Ralph has only an elementary education and 
cannot give a full account of the gravitational interactions 
between the earth, the moon and the sun. His understanding 
comes from the regularities he has been able to identify from 
experience. In comparison with an astronomer or a 
geophysicist, who can explain the various forces involved 
and provide detailed calculations for their conclusions, 
Ralph’s knowledge suddenly becomes ignorance. So should we 
come up to Ralph and say he does not know what he 
apparently knew? I think Ralph would simply reply: “Bring 
me those scientists and I’ll give them a fishing lesson!” 
Ralph’s simplified picture of the intricate phenomena at 
stake serves a practical purpose and it completely fulfils this 
end. It is patently clear, however, that Ralph would be at a 
loss to explain long-term variations such as draconic spring 
                                                     
2 DeRose’s 1995 “Solving the Skeptical Problem” makes a clear 
and unambiguous statement of such intention (see DeRose 2017, 
ch. 1). See also Cohen 1999 and 2000.  
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tides, which occur roughly every 9.3 years (see Wilson 2012; 
Wilson and Sidorenkov 2013). Should we then assert, as 
Plato did nearly twenty-five centuries ago in the Theaetetus, 
that knowledge must be accompanied by an explanation? I 
see no other way if “knowledge” is understood in this strong 
sense, but even the scientific explanation has its limits. There 
can obviously be much longer-term variations at a macro-
temporal level which involve aspects that are still to be 
grasped or that will never be grasped. 
What is the EC theorists’ take on this? They maintain that 
it all depends upon the context in which the attributors find 
themselves. An attributor whose stake is low and another 
whose stake is high will respectively say that Ralph knows 
and does not know what is happening for the simple reason 
that, in DeRose’s words, they “mean something different by 
‘know’”. Indeed, it has never been an issue for Ralph to offer 
a systematic account of tides. He just wants to ordinarily know 
his way around them and have the best fishing. An unusually 
large, draconic tide can catch him every decade or so but he 
is also able to notice its long-term consistency and err on the 
side of caution. He does not scientifically know why it happens; 
he only ordinarily knows that those extreme tides occasionally 
happen. On the other hand, astronomers and geophysicists 
understand “know” in a specialized way. For them, it means 
to integrate lots of technicalities into a coherent theory, 
which is completely alien to Ralph’s mind when he sits on a 
rock with his fishing rod. But, despite EC’s ingeniously 
crafted argument, do not the attributors presuppose that 
both Ralph and the scientists are knowing something by 
means of making approximations to its truth? This way of 
speaking is essentially uncongenial to any EC theorist 
because the basic assumption of contextualism is precisely, 
as Kevin Hermberg sensitively put it, “that truth and 
knowledge are relative to a specific social context and thus 
that there is no such thing as objective truth arrived at by 
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cognizers” (2011, 163). Description of Situations challenges this 
relativist, subjectivist view and proposes a radically different 
perspective in epistemology: what I have called elsewhere 
Context-Sensitive Objectivism, which I abbreviate as CSO 
(Venturinha forthcoming a). CSO is not driven by the mere 
context-sensitivity of knowledge attributions but rather by 
the objectively context-sensitive basis of our “claims about 
knowledge”—what Rysiew (2011, 111, fn. 1) stresses that 
EC is not interested in. This may seem contradictory but I 
am not alone in thinking that a compatibility between 
context-sensitivity and objectivism is possible. For example, 
in reflecting upon the “contextually sensitive” nature of 
“chance ascriptions”, which are conceived within an 
“objectivism about chance”, Toby Handfield avers apropos 
of context-sensitivity that “although it might mean that what 
proposition is asserted by a given sentence may depend, in part, 
on subjective factors, the truth conditions for the 
proposition asserted need not depend on subjective factors” 
(2012, 123). Let me briefly sketch the fundamentals of this 
idea.   
CSO assumes that there are n epistemic possibilities (EP) 
inherent to a state of affairs p. By the epistemic possibilities 
of p, I mean the various ways in which p can be objectively 
known, regardless of whether p is eventually known in a 
context C at a time t by a subject S.3 It follows from this 
                                                     
3 This notion of “epistemic possibilities” is totally different from 
DeRose’s, whose concern lies in “possibilities of the kind that 
sentences of the form ‘It is possible that P’ […] typically express” 
(1991, 581). Recently, Scott Aikin and Thomas Dabay have 
suggested in a way similar to DeRose that “[s]omething is an 
epistemic possibility only if we don’t know it doesn’t obtain” and 
formalized this principle in modal terms as follows: “EP: E◊p ⸧ 
~K~p” (2019, 119, my emphasis). In truth, this had already been 
propounded by Ian Hacking in his initial discussion of the issue 
when he wrote: “a state of affairs is possible if it is not known not 
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definition of EP that the knowability of p rests on mind-
independent facts. In order to preserve the objectivity of p 
when it is accessed in a given C at some t by a certain S, I see 
no need to distinguish, as Husserl did, between a situation 
and a state of affairs.4 The recognition of what can be 
objective in p cannot be done at the expense of drawing an 
intangible line separating p and, say, p*, its decontextualized 
version. What CSO vindicates is that all aspects about p that 
can be known by S in period t resulting from C are p-
subordinated. Note that, like Roderick Chisholm, I am using 
the propositional variable p to denote a state of affairs (see 
Chisholm 1986, 30 et passim).5 Therefore, within the 
framework of CSO, the EC-type sentence “S knows that p” 
depends on there being a corresponding state of affairs p that 
is propositionally expressible. Again, this propositional 
                                                     
to obtain, and no practicable investigations would establish that it 
does not obtain.” (1967, 149). Handfield (2012, 24, 71) also 
discusses “epistemic possibility” along these lines. 
4 Husserl’s distinction between “situation” (Sachlage) and “state of 
affairs” (Sachverhalt) is explained in his rather idiosyncratic style as 
follows: “What we call a situation […] appears here merely as the 
passively preconstituted foundation, qualitative or relational, of all these 
states of affairs; but subsequently, if the states of affairs have been 
constituted and objectified in an original predication, this 
foundation can be apprehended objectively as the identical 
situation which underlies them.” (1973, 241) Wittgenstein also uses 
these two terms in the Tractatus, but he takes a more monist 
approach seeing “a situation in logical space” as “the existence and 
non-existence of states of affairs” (1961, 2.11). I explore this issue 
further in chapter 2 of Description of Situations.     
5 Alluding to “Frege’s use of ‘thought’ or ‘Gedanke’”, Chisholm 
argues that “propositions” can be regarded as “a subspecies of 
states of affairs” (1986, 29). Frege actually occupies a central place 
in chapters 4 and 5 of Description of Situations. 
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expressibility of p is psychologically independent from S. 
This is what allows the sentence “S knows that p” to be 
ultimately true or false. What makes it true or false can 
neither be the attributor’s “own reasoning ability”—namely 
when the subject and the attributor are the same6—nor a 
consensus within epistemic groups, as suggested by Cohen 
(1986, 579; 1987, 15) and other contextualists. “S knows that 
p” is true iff S’s knowledge matches one or more of the n 
epistemic possibilities belonging to p. Error, on the contrary, 
occurs when there is a mismatch in relation to p. Context-
sensitivity matters only insofar as it captures the fluidity of 
reality, whose ever-changing nature excludes immutable 
truths. It is in this sense that, I am convinced, CSO is able to 
avoid what John Turri, in commenting on Michael Williams’ 
rejection of “epistemological realism”, describes as “[t]he 
realist’s major mistake”, which “is to suppose that every 
belief has an utterly unchangeable epistemological character” 
(2014, 29). Turri goes on to say that “in everyday life, the 
evidential requirements for beliefs ‘shift with context’” 
concluding that “[t]here are no fixed and immutable relations 
of epistemic priority” (ibid.). The anti-realist’s major mistake, 
as I see it, is to suppose that context shift cannot have an 
objective basis. This was what led Williams to reject that we 
should believe “that a proposition has a definite 
epistemological status simply in virtue of being ‘about the 
world’” (1988, 425).7 It is little surprise that Williams (2018, 
                                                     
6 This relation is expressed in sentences of the form “I know that 
p” and, as I discuss below, its subjectivity was explored by some 
theorists as a different kind of contextualism. 
7 What Williams characterizes as the sins of epistemological realism 
is exactly what I take to be its virtues, namely: “To treat ‘our 
knowledge of the world’ as a genuine totality, as even a possible 
object of wholesale assessment, is to suppose that there are 
objective epistemological relations underlying the shifting contexts 
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2019a, 2019b) puts too small a price on Wittgenstein’s so-
called “hinge propositions” of On Certainty, which in 
Description of Situations I take to be the best candidates for 
those propositions “about the world”.8 But let me resume 
my argument.  
If CSO is right, then Ralph will know a tidal occurrence 
p if he can estimate at least n – 1 epistemic possibilities of p, 
but he will not be able to offer a comprehensive estimation 
of p as astronomers and geophysicists will since the latter 
depends on an articulation in a justified theory of the 
epistemic possibilities n – 1, n – 2, n – 3, …, ideally reaching 
n – n. I can hear the EC theorist grumbling: “So what’s new 
if they all know? That’s the point!” However, Ralph does not 
know p because he himself or someone else attributes this 
knowledge to him on the presumption that to “know” means 
in this context to estimate fortnightly spring tides. He does 
know p because he knows something about p that originates 
from p. When compared to a scientist’s knowledge, Ralph’s 
knowledge looks extremely narrow. But the most important 
thing is that they do not “mean something different by 
‘know’” for on their different planes they are making 
approximations to the truth of p. If knowledge were a 
concept determined by the epistemic standards of an 
individual or a social group, and not by the states of affairs 
themselves, we would have to accept unreasonable claims to 
know made by demented persons or conspiracy theorists like 
                                                     
and standards of everyday justification. It is to assume that context-
sensitivity does not go all the way down, there being rather an 
underlying objective structure of justificational relations that 
philosophical reflection brings into view and which allows us to 
determine, in some general, uniform way, whether we are entitled 
to claim knowledge of the world.” (1988, 425)    
8 I respond to Williams 2019b—which is a commentary on 
Description of Situations—in Venturinha 2019. 
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flat earthers. As the radical sceptic has no qualms about 
raising doubts about what normal people take for granted, 
defenders of a flat earth make use of the most perverse 
arguments to call into question all scientific evidence that the 
earth is spherical. And, astonishing as it may seem, all that 
EC can say about flat earthers and radical sceptics is that, 
given their unusually high epistemic standards, they may well 
be right. We would be tempted to agree with Timothy 
Williamson that “contextualists are apt to console 
themselves with the thought that although most denials of 
‘knowledge’ in [a] context of scepticism are correct, in 
everyday contexts many assertions of ‘knowledge’ are also 
correct” (2005a, 689). However, what Williamson acutely 
observes is “the gravity of the situation in which the sceptic 
has put contextualists, on their own analysis” (ibid.). Let me 
adapt an example Williamson gives to illustrate this point—
there being a whiteboard in the room within the context of 
an epistemology seminar and outdoors—to the case I was 
discussing and follow the direction of his line of reasoning. 
If someone affirms, against flat earthers, “Scientists know 
that the earth is round”, the factivity of knowledge implies 
that the analytically entailed sentence “The earth is round” 
be true in both the flat earthers’ world (even if they take this 
sentence to be false) and the scientists’ world.9 Either the 
earth is flat or it is round! But a scrupulous contextualist, in 
the face of flat earthers’ criticism, will dodge the choice and 
contradictorily assert “The earth is round and I don’t know 
that the earth is round”. Mylan Engel Jr. summarizes well the 
conundrum in which EC is trapped when he defines “the 
metalinguistic turn”: 
 
                                                     
9 On the factive character of knowledge, see also Williamson 2000, 
ch. 1, and, specifically directed against contextualism, 2001, 26 ff.  
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First, contextualists maintain that there is no 
correct context-independent standard of 
knowledge. Consequently, there is no context-
independent fact of the matter as to whether or 
not S knows that p. Since there is no fact of the 
matter as to whether or not S knows that p 
outside a context of ascription, they maintain 
that we epistemologists should drop all talk 
about whether or not S knows that p. Our 
focus, instead, should be on whether sentences 
of the form ‘S knows that p’ are true in some 
specified context of ascription. (2004, 207)     
 
EC thus needs reasonable standards, but who can set them 
except those who make first-person knowledge claims or 
attribute knowledge to others always within an epistemic 
group—even if its epistemic merits have never been 
questioned? A perfect world would certainly be one 
governed by what DeRose has called “pure reasonableness”, 
but deep disagreements show that we are still far from such 
a stage of civilizational evolution.10 DeRose admits that in a 
certain conversation 
 
the matter of which of our speakers is speaking 
the truth depends on facts about what are the 
reasonable standards for them to use in their 
situation. And, of course, this opens up a whole 
host of questions that I won’t even begin to 
address about what makes standards the 
reasonable ones to use. (2009, 142). 
 
                                                     
10 DeRose’s attempt to answer Williamson’s concerns discussed 
above evokes precisely the “reasonableness view” (2017, 129).   
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He writes a bit further on: 
 
It’s good for speakers to use reasonable 
standards (or, more generally, reasonable 
scores), of course. But if they opt for 
unreasonable standards, I’m inclined to think 
the truth-conditions of their claims then reflect 
those unreasonable standards that they are 
indicating. (Ibid.) 
 
I am convinced that this brief survey suffices to 
realize that, all in all, EC creates more problems than it 
solves. This is unfortunate because context matters to a 
great extent, only not perhaps in the way in which EC 
theorists would have wished. Criticisms 
notwithstanding, EC still attracts many devoted 
followers who, unwilling to pay the price of realism, 
happily subscribe to a view that, in Paul K. Moser’s 
evasive words, “finds the basis of epistemic justification 
in a social consensus of some sort” (1989, 183, my 
emphasis). But I do not think that epistemologists 
should be satisfied with such a muddle about what is to 
know, especially if they are committed to solving the 
sceptical problem instead of sweeping it under the rug.  
 
 
2. SUBJECT-SENSITIVE INVARIANTISM  
 
One alternative to EC that is also (at least to a certain 
extent) contextualist and that I did not explore in 
Description of Situations is so-called Subject-Sensitive 
Invariantism (SSI). The label comes from DeRose 
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(2004; 2009, ch. 6), who criticizes the views of authors 
such as Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath, the first 
to advocate against contextualism that “a subject’s 
pragmatic situation may affect her justification” (2002, 
70), John Hawthorne, with his “(subject-)sensitive 
moderate invariantism” (2004, ch. 4), and Jason Stanley, 
who speaks more specifically of “interest-relative 
invariantism” (2005, chs. 5-7). What is from the outset 
rejected by SSI, as Hawthorne explains, is “ascriber-
dependence”, which “forces the thesis of context-
dependence” (2004, 157). More specifically, Hawthorne 
writes, 
 
it forces the conclusion that two ascribers may 
be looking at a single subject at the same time 
and one truly say[s] ‘He knows that p’, another 
‘He doesn’t know that p’. Contradiction is 
avoided by claiming that the verb ‘know’ 
expresses different relations in the mouths of 
each ascriber. (Ibid.) 
 
The solution, then, is “to consider the deliberative 
context of the subject” and this means being sensitive to its 
“practical environment” wherein rests “the truth of 
knowledge ascriptions” (ibid., 180). On this view, it would 
not be possible to have, as in EC, someone ascribing 
knowledge to Ralph on the basis of low epistemic standards 
(e.g. his fishing mates) and someone else denying it on the 
basis of high epistemic standards (e.g. a scientist listening to 
a conversation between Ralph and his fishing mates) without 
contradiction. What is relevant are only, in Stanley’s jargon, 
“the subject’s practical interests” (2005, 122). Thus, if Ralph 
is merely interested in predicting the occurrence of spring 
tides every fortnight and he succeeds in doing so, then he 
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knows it. The same holds true for the astronomers and 
geophysicists whose interest lies in achieving scientific 
understanding of tidal phenomena. As in EC, in SSI 
everyone knows in the last analysis. But whereas EC can trust 
that the knowledge attributor will appeal to some 
“reasonable standards”, SSI does not enjoy those standards 
inasmuch as the attributor’s context is considered 
epistemically irrelevant. Elke Brendel offers a useful 
snapshot of what is at stake when she avows that “at any 
given time t, a knowledge ascription ‘S knows that p’ has a 
fixed truth value due to the fixed practical interests of S at t” 
and this means that “‘know’ is a univocal knowledge relation 
in SSI” (2012, 34). Accordingly, there is no variability of 
“know” between contexts of attribution—and hence the 
invariantism that is appended to the subject-sensitive nature 
of our knowledge claims. Taking into account, as Jonathan 
Schaffer puts it, that SSI theorists “claim to capture the 
contextualist data without the shifty semantics” (2006, 87), 
then it could seem that an invariantist view might help my 
case and that SSI would be closer to CSO than EC is. But to 
lay all the emphasis on the subject is too dangerous a step 
for epistemologists to take. If knowledge is construed in 
terms of our “needs and interests”, as insisted on by Fantl 
and McGrath (2002, 71), one of the most vexing outcomes 
of SSI will be the relegation of specialized knowledge to just 
another point of view. Here is how Schaffer lucidly 
approaches this question: 
 
In general, the social role of the expert is to 
serve as a reservoir of knowledge. This requires 
a stability in one’s pool of knowledge that is not 
compatible with SSI. The social status of 
expertise cannot fluctuate as the stakes rise and 
fall. For instance, one cannot gain in expertise 
by suddenly not caring about the topic. So I 
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conclude that the status of expertise is not 
sensitive to what is at stake for the subject. 
(2006, 97) 
 
At the core of SSI lies an idea of ready-made knowledge as 
what fuels all of our practices. There is definitely something 
epistemically important in the way we know how to do the 
most varied things. However, that I know how to walk does 
not entail that I know that which biomechanically allows me 
to walk. It is no coincidence that Stanley, together with 
Williamson, has questioned the Rylean view according to 
which “there is a fundamental distinction between 
knowledge-how and knowledge-that”, viewing the former as 
“simply a species” of the latter (Stanley and Williamson 2001, 
411).11 To investigate the manner in which our propositions 
hinge on more basic ones that are not, to speak like Duncan 
Pritchard, “in the market for knowledge” (2016, 77 et passim) 
may be, so Description of Situations suggests, a promising path. 
But the kind of Moorean certainties that we know without 
knowing supplies no “interest-relative” standard whatsoever. 
Looking at the matter from the perspective of EC, seen as 
the only contender “able to provide a socially fitting 
conception of knowledge”, Schaffer strongly argues that 
“knowledge must not be sensitive to what is at stake for the 
subject, but must rather be sensitive to what is in question 
for the attributor” (Schaffer 2006, 100).12 CSO, in turn, is in 
                                                     
11 On this topic, see in addition Stanley 2011. Williamson, however, 
does not present himself as an SSI-er, proposing in place of EC or 
SSI an “insensitive invariantism”, described as “the view on which 
the epistemic terms at issue undergo no shift in the standard for 
their correct application” (2005b, 213). See more below. 
12 Other relevant criticisms of SSI can be found in Blaauw 2008, 
Brown 2008, Blome-Tillmann 2009 and Baumann 2016. 
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a very particular sense context-sensitive, but it rejects that 
either epistemic variantism across contexts or subject-
sensitivity within a specific context can contribute to an 
inclusive view of knowledge which must go beyond the 
social sphere.13  
 
 
3. INSENSITIVE INVARIANTISM 
 
What about Insensitive Invariantism (II for short)? Can 
it do better than EC and SSI? There are, no doubt, some 
points in favour of II. Above all, it is not a relativistic view 
amenable to attributor contexts or subject contexts. Quite 
the contrary, it is an epistemological view which assumes that 
this thing we call truth is not laid down by ourselves and that 
knowledge involves apprehending something about reality. In 
this sense, it looks very similar to CSO, at least to its 
objectivistic component. In fact, compare my 
characterization of CSO to how Wayne A. Davis justifies his 
preference for II over both EC and SSI: 
 
I advocate classical or insensitive invariantism, on 
which the truth conditions of ‘S knows p’ do 
not vary with truth-independent factors. 
[…] There is a wide variety of uncontroversially 
context-sensitive terms, but all behave 
differently from ‘knows p’ in several ways. For 
example, ‘is flat’ and ‘is heavy’ allow 
comparisons and relativizations, as do ‘knows 
Paris’, ‘knows how to dance’, and ‘is justified in 
believing p’. But ‘knows that p’ cannot be 
qualified by more or better, and we never say 
                                                     
13 The subtitle of my book, An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology, 
must thus be taken with a pinch of salt. 
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things like: He knows it’s true by (or relative to) low 
standards, but not high standards; He knows it’s true 
compared to Mary, but not Jane; or He knows it’s true, 
but not perfectly. (2017, 219)  
 
From Davis’ insensitive invariantist account, what Ralph 
supposedly knows about spring tides would only be 
permissible if it were expressed under the form of the 
examples given at the end of this quotation. Ralph, however, 
does not evidently say that He knows it’s true that spring tides 
happen every fortnight by (or relative to) low standards, but not high 
standards, that He knows it’s true that spring tides happen every 
fortnight compared to his fishing mate Stubb, but not scientists or that 
He knows it’s true that spring tides happen every fortnight, but not 
perfectly. The point made by II-ers is precisely that Ralph sees 
no further possibilities of knowing that p and unjustifiably 
takes his understanding of the phenomenon to constitute 
knowledge. In other words, he is unaware of his ignorance. To 
speak about low standards for knowing that p is already the 
result of our recognition of there being higher standards for 
doing it. When we are in such an epistemic position, the II-
er maintains, only high standards are admissible and there is 
simply no room for low standards. The problem for II is that 
what we now regard as the (high) standard for knowledge 
can in the future turn out to be merely a lower standard or 
even an error, with the (high) standard being replaced by a 
new one. Just think about what Ptolemy and his followers, 
unaware that they were misconceiving the heavenly bodies 
as revolving around a stationary earth in circular orbits, 
considered as high standards in comparison with 
Copernicus, who within his heliocentric model nevertheless 
kept the idea of circular motion, or Kepler, who showed that 
planetary orbits are elliptical. 
Our position, like Ralph’s and anybody else’s, is always 
viewed as the standard, even if we recognize that it can be 
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revisable. In that case, the standard will be to hold a 
revisionary posture, one that ultimately leads to an awareness 
of continuous possible ignorance in the midst of which 
knowledge must be permanently treated as provisional. Does 
this imply adopting a form of scepticism? Williamson 
actually highlights that “[s]ome insensitive invariantists are 
sceptics”, given that for them “‘know’ invariably refers to a 
maximal epistemic standard that we cannot meet” (2005b, 
225). He thus proposes an “anti-sceptical insensitive 
invariantism” (ASII for short), within which “‘know’ 
invariably refers to an epistemic standard that we can and do 
meet quite easily” since “everyday ascriptions of knowledge 
are often true” (ibid.). Williamson’s strategy is to replace the 
II-er’s “attempt to explain the illusion of knowledge” with 
another task proper to the ASII-er, which consists of 
explaining “the illusion of ignorance” (ibid.). Williamson is 
absolutely right in arguing that there are limits to what can 
be doubted and that philosophical scepticism is responsible 
for introducing a radically unnatural suspicion. His diagnosis 
that “an illusion of epistemic danger” is the “result from 
exposure to lurid stories about brains in vats, evil demons, 
painted mules, or gamblers who bet the farm” (ibid., 226) 
seems to me perfectly judicious. However, while I fully 
subscribe to the anti-scepticism of this view, Williamson’s 
appeal to “practical reasoning” (ibid., 227 ff.) makes ASII 
coincident with SSI.14 What is distinctive of any insensitive 
invariantist description is indeed the denial that “practical” 
reasons can affect the knowledge relation. Michael Hannon 
stresses this point when he writes: 
 
Insensitive invariantism is the main source of 
resistance to contextualism. According to this 
view, what counts as being in a sufficiently 
                                                     
14 See note 11 above. 
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good epistemic position to know does not vary 
with practical facts about the context. 
Whatever the subject’s or the attributor’s (or 
someone else’s) practical interests might be, 
there is some good epistemic position in which 
an agent must stand with respect to a 
proposition in order for that agent to know it. 
(2019, 165) 
 
Hannon brings to the fore an inevitable struggle against 
contextual factors that is typical of II-ers, for whom the 
“good epistemic position” is not relative to standards. So 
what should distinguish ASII-ers? If Williamson has in mind, 
for instance, that Ralph cannot doubt that a spring tide 
happens every fortnight or (imagining a theoretical scenario 
or that Ralph suddenly suffers from some mental disorder) 
that the fishing rod in his hand and his own hands are real, I 
would completely agree. But I do not see how—within 
Williamson’s framework—uttering those things can be 
conceived without the attributor of EC or the subject of SSI. 
And since any form of invariantism per definitionem excludes 
EC’s variantism, ASII can only fit in SSI. As a matter of fact, 
Williamson’s KPR principle, which states that “A first-
person present-tense ascription of ‘know’ with respect to a 
proposition is true in a context iff that proposition is an 
appropriate premise for practical reasoning in that context” 
(2005b, 227; see also 231), is manifestly subject-sensitive 
invariantist and as such not anti-sceptical at all. Ralph does 
not know what he is convinced he knows about tides only 
because what he knows is an appropriate premise for his practical 
reasoning. Definitely it is, but that he cannot even imagine to 
reason differently in his daily practice would neither detain 
the sceptic from raising Humean doubts about Ralph’s 
inductively inferred beliefs nor, more importantly, the 
scientist from claiming another level of knowledge that can 
 Book Symposium: Nuno Venturinha. Description of Situations 183 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 43, n. 3, pp. 164-258, Jul.-Sep. 2020. 
be attained. The closure of Williamson’s ASII—as that of 
SSI—cannot thus originate more than what Ian Evans and 
Nicholas Smith called “a (compelling) fallibilist invariantist 
explanation of our intuitions” (2012, 69). 
Yet, unlike Evans and Smith, I do not find fallibilism 
compelling. Following Wittgenstein (1974) and Lewis (1999), 
I argue that a fallibilist view, equally defended by 
contextualists like Cohen (1988), does not provide the best 
shield against radical scepticism and that only infallibilism 
can coherently demonstrate the illogical character of the 
sceptic’s manoeuvres.15 The advantage of an infallibilist 
perspective is that it is capable of being intransigent about 
what cannot be subject to doubt without sacrificing 
revisionism, as the reflex of a natural progress of knowledge. 
Pritchard’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty 
offers an excellent framework in making room for a 
distinction between “über hinge commitments”—intimately 
connected with “anti-skeptical hinge commitments” and 
formulated in “über hinge propositions” or “anti-skeptical 
hinge propositions”—and “personal hinge 
commitments”—with their “personal hinge propositions” 
(2016, 95-97). While the former “hinge commitments” are 
stationary, the latter are susceptible to change as long as they 
mirror our embedment in a world where culture and science 
evolve. On this view, which is at the bottom of CSO, Ralph 
can perfectly claim that he knows that spring tides occur 
                                                     
15 I elaborate on this in chapters 6, 7 and 11 of Description of 
Situations, while chapters 8, 9 and 10 are devoted to different 
sceptical attitudes. See also Venturinha 2020a, in which I defend a 
Lewisian “non-sceptical infallibilism” against the fallibilism 
articulated by Jessica Brown in her 2018, and Venturinha 
forthcoming b, in which I respond from a Wittgensteinian 
standpoint to Anna Boncompagni’s fallibilist approach set forth in 
a commentary on my book (Boncompagni forthcoming). 
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every fortnight and at the same time the scientists can claim 
that they know how to explain tidal phenomena according 
to what is scientifically established so far. As pointed out, 
this could also be the outcome in EC but, contrary to what 
EC theorists admit, what is known is presupposed as being 
known “about the world”. Without this presupposition, 
which is anchored to the über hinges as our most elementary 
natural ties to the world, EC’s response to scepticism is 
completely defective. It could be argued that what Ralph 
knows about tides would then be comparable to what, say, a 
seagull knows about them, though I do not see this as 
constituting an objection.16 Wittgenstein understands 
“certainty” to mean exactly “a form of life”, envisaging it “as 
something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified, as 
it were, as something animal” (1974, §§ 358-359). It should 
be noted in addition that the epistemic multiplicity permitted 
by CSO—akin to the epistemic variability permitted by 
EC—is not tolerable by either SSI (including ASII) or II. 
Whereas the former can only admit Ralph’s low-standards 
knowledge claims, the latter can do no more than only 
admitting the opposite.  
Table 1 gives a perspicuous arrangement of the different 
options available. It is modelled on Michael Blome-
Tillmann’s scorecards that access the compatibility and 
incompatibility with EC and SSI of “temporal embeddings”, 
“modal embeddings” and “conjunctive ascriptions” (2009, 
316). My table is somewhat less ambitious and aims to access 
                                                     
16 In commenting on Ernest Sosa’s initial discussion of the matter 
(1988), I consider in chapter 3 of Description of Situations that 
attributing knowledge to animals cannot just be seen as 
“metaphorical” insofar as they certainly know something “about 
the world”. This leads me to reject in that chapter, after Bolzano, 
Frege and Lewis, a correspondence theory of truth, which is 
necessarily anthropocentric.   
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only the compatibility and incompatibility with EC, SSI, II 
and CSO of Ralph’s low-standard knowledge as opposed to 




 Low Standards High Standards 
EC   
SSI  n/a 
II n/a  
CSO   
 
Here one clearly sees that in SSI or II, as Brendel put it, 
“‘know’ is a univocal knowledge relation” and that EC, 
although it has shortcomings, is nonetheless closer to CSO 
in treating knowledge as multifarious. Much work is still 
needed to make a comprehensive epistemological theory out 
of CSO. In particular, it must be flexible enough to 
accommodate very different kinds of knowledge attributions 
or claims. But I hope that my arguments have shown that 
CSO can provide a more solid theoretical basis than the 
alternatives proposed in contemporary epistemology. At 
least one thing seems certain: its rival theories do not involve 
less problems. Many will say, however, that objectivism is an 
illusion and that we should conform to the idea that the 
world is always a result of our projections. Is it not the 
corollary of quantum mechanics that, as theoretical physicist 
Carlo Rovelli eagerly professes, “we must accept the idea that 
reality is only interaction”, that it is “less about objects than 
about interactive relationships” (2016, 18, 41)? Here I prefer 
to side with Einstein’s view, old-fashioned as it may look, for 
whom “quantum mechanics is logically consistent but […] it 
is an incomplete manifestation of an underlying theory in 
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which an objectively real description is possible” (Pais 2005, 
455) or, more simply, “a self-consistent but incomplete 
description of the objective processes” (Lehner 2014, 331). 
The fact that general relativity continues to subsist alongside 
quantum theory, despite being incompatible with one 
another, shows that there is still room for epistemological 
realism. Those who do not feel attracted to such a quest for 
objectivity can perhaps take comfort in the moral 
subjectivism articulated in the last chapter of Description of 
Situations, which is in stark contrast to the previous chapters.    
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“I am working at a table. There is a lot in these words” 
(Venturinha 2018, 2). There is, according to Nuno 
Venturinha, a large set of logical and ontological 
presuppositions: about other persons and me, about 
negation, about the world and what there is, and even about 
what there may be, possible worlds, and the nature of 
possibility. The “descriptive exercise” that tries to unfold the 
logical and ontological structures that are already there, in 
our everyday use of language, is the way Venturinha 
proposes, in Description of Situations, to address the difficulties 
of epistemology from a contextualist point of view. The 
book is a singular, ambitious and vigorous argument that 
mobilizes an impressive number of conceptions, 
philosophers and books, from Aristotle and Aquinas to 
Bolzano, Husserl and Wittgenstein, in order to justify its 
choice for contextualism (with a Wittgensteinian flavor) in 
epistemology. This is a risky enterprise that puts the book in 
the way of an enormous number of possible objections. 
However, its strength lies where we expect to find its 
weakness: it is structured in such a way that it is convincing, 
with relevant comments on different philosophies, and the 
arguments are made as it moves from one conception to the 
other. The result is that questions about details of its remarks 
on Rawls, Heidegger or Aquinas, for example, are secondary 
to its broader reasonings and results. 
Two themes will be addressed here, in order to get clear 
about the book’s more basic commitments: the relationships 
between logic, ontology, and epistemology (and their 
connections with the Platonist and Tractarian traditions); 
and the particular variety of contextualism that Venturinha 
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embraces, in opposition to “classical contextualism”, and the 





The classical strategy to support an ontological thesis, 
which comes from Parmenides and Plato, is to ask how the 
world must be in order for it to be possible to present true 
and false statements about it: ontology is built up from logic. 
That there are different things and that some of them 
“participate” in others seems to be a condition of the 
meaning of propositions: we say that “A is B” when A is 
different from B (like we do in the proposition “the sky is 
blue”); this “being B” should have an ontological 
counterpart. That there are essences seems to be a condition 
for the meaning of general terms, for there should be 
“something” that they mean, that they refer to. Or, in an 
argument that Venturinha borrows from the Tractatus, logical 
analysis and the meaningfulness of our system of 
propositions presupposes, as a necessary condition, that the 
world is not a set of objects, but “the totality of facts” 
(Wittgenstein 1961, 1.1); and that we can talk about objects 
only in the context of a state of affairs.17 The problem with 
this strategy is that ontology, established this way, regularly 
asserts the necessary existence of fabulous beings like 
“unthought thoughts”, things that are neither existent, nor 
non-existent, or that are eternal and cannot be destroyed 
(like the “simple objects” of the Tractatus) (cf. Wittgenstein 
2009, § 55). It is still more problematic in a post-Kantian 
context that assimilates the distinction between noumena 
and phenomena. 
                                                     
17 “If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in 
states of affairs.” (Wittgenstein 1961, 2.0123) 
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The epistemological problem that Venturinha’s 
contextualism intends to address is an alternative 
formulation of an argument that we find in Nietzsche: Kant’s 
assertion that the world of our experience is phenomenal 
(appearance), together with the classical Aristotelian 
conception of truth as correspondence to what is (“to say of 
what is that it is”), implies that nothing we may say is true. 
In Venturinha’s words: 
 
the problem with the correspondence thesis, 
from a multispecies perspective, is that one 
must admit as many correspondences—and 
consequently truths—as the existing cognitive 
modes. (Venturinha 2018, 21) 
 
In a sequel to Kant’s Copernican Revolution, knowledge 
is conceived as presupposing an “agreement structure”, a 
“conceptual scheme”. The result is an unavoidable 
perspectivism: 
 
[…] a thing can only be known if its knowledge 
falls within a certain structure that sanctions 
this knowing. […] 
Taken in this way, the correspondence theory 
leaves us in a problematic relativism since truth 
utterly depends on the angle through which 
things are contemplated. More complicated 
than that, the sole criterion for assessing truth 
in general is this very same angle and one 
cannot go beyond the horizon it opens. This is 
what the Kantian problem of the thing in itself is 
all about. (Ibid., 22) 
 
The dramatic conclusion that “we cannot know it [the 
thing in itself] for we are condemned to have appearances” 
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(ibid.) seems quite close to Kleist in his Kantian crisis.18 
From this perspective, philosophy is still contemporary to 
those that followed Kant and his unexpected support of an 
ontological relativism: we should readdress the logico-
ontological problem in order to avoid subjectivism and 
relativism in epistemology. The quest that we follow in 
Description of Situations is that for a fundamental ontology that 
supports our epistemological claims and the rejection of 
relativism and skepticism. That is why, at the core of 
Venturinha’s book, we find an unanticipated debate with 
Bolzano, Frege, Husserl, and Heidegger. It intends to unfold 
a new ontological foundation for the contextualist 
epistemological claims. 
Against this background, Bolzano’s idea of propositions in 
itself appears as a defense of objectivity against relativism and 
subjectivism, and that there may be knowledge of reality. 
Bolzano opens the way to the alternative Venturinha finally 
seems to embrace:  
 
In Bolzano’s view, in turn, each proposition 
that can be enunciated or merely thought is 
implied by a proposition in itself that is already 
tangible though not in its entirety. The world 
for Bolzano is not a relation composed of 
                                                     
18 H. von Kleist’s letter to Wilhelmine, March 22nd, 1801: “We 
cannot decide if what we call truth is truly truth, or if it only appears 
to us that way. If that is so, then the truth we gather here is no 
more after death—and every effort to acquire a property that also 
follows us into the grave is in vain […].” [“Wir können nicht 
entscheiden, ob das, was wir Wahrheit nennen, wahrhaft Wahrheit 
ist, oder ob es uns nur so scheint. Ist das letzte, so ist die Wahrheit, 
die wir hier sammeln, nach dem Tode nicht mehr—und alles 
Bestreben, ein Eigentum sich zu erwerben, das uns auch in das 
Grab folgt, ist vergeblich (…).”] (Kleist 1961, ch. 3) 
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objects and our cognition of them, which 
brings with it the problem of correspondence. 
Bolzano’s world is already propositional in itself. 
[...] It is indeed a consequence of Bolzano’s 
proposal that, with the rejection of a 
correspondence theory, there must be a 
common ground—the reality—despite all 
differences between the multifarious accesses 
to it. (Venturinha 2018, 23) 
 
Bolzano’s ontology attempts to reintroduce objectivity 
and reality in this new, Copernican context: his concepts of 
truth in itself and idea in itself (Vorstellung an sich), similar to 
Frege’s “thinking” and Meinong’s “subsistence” (bestehend), 
are the objective references that assure meaning to false or 
even impossible propositions.19 But it does that at the price 
of offending our “sense of reality” (these are the words 
Russell used to characterize Meinong’s ontology).20 After all, 
the idea that the meaning of the proposition “my notebook 
and my pen are side by side” is assured by a proposition in itself 
                                                     
19 Bolzano’s influence can be seen also in Martin, Twardowski and 
Brentano. 
20 “One of the difficulties of the study of logic is that it is an 
exceedingly abstract study dealing with the most abstract things 
imaginable, and yet you cannot pursue it properly unless you have 
a vivid instinct as to what is real. You must have that instinct rather 
well developed in logic. I think otherwise you will get into fantastic 
things. I think Meinong is rather deficient in just that instinct for 
reality. Meinong maintains that there is such an object as the round 
square only it does not exist, and it does not even subsist, but 
nevertheless there is such an object, and when you say ‘The round 
square is a fiction’, he takes it that there is an object ‘the round 
square’ and there is a predicate ‘fiction’. No one with a sense of 
reality would so analyse that proposition.” (Russell 1919, 56-57) 
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that was always there, independent of anybody thinking, 
knowing or saying it, is peculiar.21 Bolzano presents his ideas 
in itself in the following terms: 
 
By objective idea I mean the certain something 
which constitutes the immediate matter [Stoff] 
of a subjective idea, and which is not to be 
found in the realm of the actual. An objective 
idea does not require a subject but subsists 
[bestehen], not indeed as something existing, but 
as a certain something even though no thinking 
being may grasp it; also, it is not multiplied 
when it is thought by one, two, three, or more 
beings, unlike the corresponding subjective 
ideas, which are present many times. Hence the 
name objective. For this reason, any word, unless 
it is ambiguous, designates only one objective 
idea, but there are innumerable subjective ideas 
which it causes […]. 
By object of an idea I mean that something 
(sometimes existing and sometimes non-
existing) of which we say that the idea 
[Vorstellung] represents [vorstellt] it, or of which it is 
a representation. (Bolzano 2014, 158-159) 
 
Contrary to the followers of Bolzano, the primary goal of 
Russell’s “On Denoting” (1905) is to explain how semantics 
can avoid the supposition that there must be a fantastic 
ontology of objective contents. Russell’s answer is evidently 
simpler and more elegant. However, he does not give up the 
                                                     
21 Venturinha points out that this description of “objective ideas” 
and of a “proposition in itself” have a theological substratum in 
Bolzano, pointing to something like a “perspective from God”. 
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idea that ontology is the counterpart of logic. And it still 
results in an ontology that lacks a sense of reality. It becomes 
clear in Wittgenstein’s formulation of the analytical project 
in the Tractatus, which is closely related to “On Denoting”: it 
demands the necessary existence of simple objects that are 
eternal and indestructible. Without these objects, there can 
be no guarantee that analysis has an end and, consequently, 
that words have meaning.22 
However, Venturinha does not suppose that Bolzano’s 
conception of objectivity is an alternative in its original 
formulation. Charles Travis’s rejection of the idea that there 
may be “unthought thoughts” makes explicit the reason for 
that. The problem is the same that applies to Frege’s thoughts. 
In the end, it is still the flirtation of ontology with the 
fantastic: 
 
That a group of men can hide themselves inside 
a wooden horse to attack their enemies 
unexpectedly is not a thought of Homer. 
Anyone can represent that and no one really 
knows whether it happened or not. The big 
question is: who thinks Fregean thoughts? Not 
who participates in these thoughts, but for 
whom do they exist? (Venturinha 2018, 39) 
 
According to Venturinha, an alternative solution to this 
problem can be found in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and 
its use of the concepts of “hinge propositions” and “system 
of evidence”:  
 
                                                     
22 For a debate about ontology in Wittgenstein’s philosophy, see 
Carvalho 2019. 
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Even an uneducated person would be puzzled 
if she were told that her ancestry goes back only 
150 years. The picture of the world that we 
share, despite all variances in content, cannot 
be changed so drastically. That is why 
Wittgenstein calls attention to the systematic 
character of this evidence, which offers itself, 
more than certain, as secure. It is the self-evidence 
of the system that legitimates what can count 
as an admissible element within it. (Ibid., 51) 
 
Evidences are solid because they constitute a system. It is 
the secure ground that is presupposed by all our everyday 
assertions. And at its core, incrusted in it, there are hinge 
propositions. This image plays a central role in the new kind of 
contextualism conceived by Venturinha: 
 
Wittgenstein does something quite different 
than full-blooded contextualists do when they 
seek for evidence. He sees the evidential 
bedrock of each situation as materializing in 
hinge propositions which, for him, should 
constitute a new field of epistemological 
inquiry. He explains that “the questions that we 
raise and our doubts depend on the fact that 
some propositions are exempt from doubt, are 
as it were like hinges [Angeln] on which those 
turn” […]. A hinge cannot be learned in 
isolation. It is assimilated by us in practice—in 
the practice of the varied “language games” we 
play, to use a key notion of Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy. (Ibid., 51-52) 
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3. 
 
Before coming to a conclusion about the epistemological 
question, however, Venturinha deals with the problem of 
subjectivism. He does that by discussing Descartes’s 
skepticism and his “modal question” about essence and 
existence; Kant’s “constituent schemes”, that “organize” the 
given (resuming the objection that it implies that we lose 
“contact with truth” [ibid., 70]); and Husserl’s 
phenomenological project. It is with Husserl that we find for 
the first time a perspective that makes clear the kind of 
contextualism that Venturinha has in mind and how 
subjectivity finds its place in it.  
 
Husserl is not interested in the Cartesian ego 
cogito—or in the Kantian Ich denke—but in the 
torrent of cogitationes that are transcendentally 
produced and that form “my own pure 
conscious life” […]. Phenomenology has 
indeed the merit of seeking a description of the 
given without endorsing any metaphysical 
theory about it. (Ibid., 75) 
 
A central role is attributed, in the Cartesian Meditations, to 
the concept of “being in the world” and to the texture of our 
suppositions (actualizing the Aristotelian Doctrine of 
Supposition). Husserl’s phenomenological project conceives 
the subject from the perspective of its relationships to 
others. 
 
What intentionality reveals, in Husserl’s view, 
is that our awareness is indisputably an 
awareness of something other than ourselves.  
[…] intentionality defends a mutual relation (S 
↔ O). What this amounts to is that the things 
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I have before me and the coffee shop at the 
corner of the street require my intentional 
projection of them, as cogitata, to be what they 
are. Consequently, without an admission of 
their complete independence of subjective 
conditions, the modal impasse is maintained. 
(Ibid,, 75-76) 
 
Husserl’s project is, however, bound to fail in the 
epistemological debate from the beginning: it implies 
solipsism, the impossibility of being able to say that 
“anything or anybody exists” (cf. Hermberg 2006, x, apud 
Venturinha 2018, 78). Again, it is Wittgenstein that presents 
a proper solution and helps to produce a final formulation 
of contextualism. It is only in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy 
that we can find, according to Venturinha, an adequate 
formulation about our fundamental ontology and the social 
character of subjectivity. Wittgenstein’s “background” is the 
substitute for Husserl’s “life world” (cf. Venturinha 2018, 
78), without the epistemological problems that follow from 
Husserl’s egology. 
One preliminary conclusion about Description of Situations 
is that it faces the contemporary debate about contextualism 
from a “traditional” perspective, a logico-ontological 
investigation updated by Kant and his followers. 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is accessed from that 
perspective. However, that Wittgenstein is still part of that 
Platonic-Kantian debate is not evident. One reason for 
thinking so is that the ontological claims that can be found 
in the Tractatus do not have any place in the Philosophical 
Investigations. On the contrary, maybe Wittgenstein presents a 
radical alternative to this classical formulation and opens the 
way to a different strategy against relativism and skepticism. 
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4. 
 
According to Venturinha, classical contextualism does 
not present a satisfactory answer to the question about “the 
evidence of its evidence”, about the epistemic status of that 
which constitutes the ultimate basis of justification: 
 
In fact, my believing that I am working at this 
table, that I have a body and am surrounded by 
material objects, etc., though contextually 
justified, is not immune to a question about its 
evidentness. A classic form of epistemic 
contextualism would not help here. Can a 
Wittgensteinian-type of contextualism do 
better? I am convinced it can. (Ibid., 70-71) 
 
It is, in fact, in the Wittgensteinian conception that there 
is a background that we access as a system of evidence, that is 
presupposed by our practices, in which we can identify hinge 
propositions, that Venturinha finds the elements to reformulate 
contextualism in epistemology. Wittgenstein’s strategy 
assures a “natural ontology” that is immune to skepticism 
and solipsism. It is, in Beyer’s words, a “background of 
epistemic justification” (ibid., 78). Supposedly, Wittgenstein, 
in On Certainty, makes clear an ontological foundation that is 
essentially contextual and that guarantees that we may say we 
know, in a proper sense, that that is a book, or that we are 
reading now. As he says, 
 
Can I doubt it? Grounds for doubt are lacking! 
Everything speaks in its favour, nothing against 
it. (Wittgenstein 1974, § 4) 
 
Duncan Pritchard, like Venturinha, thinks that 
epistemological disjunctivism and Wittgensteinian 
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contextualism, taken together, offer an adequate answer to 
“radical skepticism” (cf. Venturinha 2018, 55). The problem 
with that solution, says Pritchard, is that although it provides 
an answer to epistemological skepticism, it does not 
eliminate the “vertigo” that follows from it: 
 
Yet, Pritchard admits, an “epistemic vertigo” 
may subsist after the loss of our “epistemic 
innocence” […]. He explains that “the 
phenomenon of epistemic vertigo is more 
psychological than philosophical, in that it 
describes the particular phenomenology 
involved when one has resolved the skeptical 
puzzle” […]. (Ibid.) 
 
According to Prichard, “the Wittgensteinian element” in 
this answer to skepticism, the “essential locality of rational 
evaluation”, results in intellectual anxiety: we tend to seek an 
“overall perspective” on our epistemic position (Pritchard 
2016, 185-186). Accepting the epistemological limitations 
implied by the Wittgensteinian answer does not seem to 
come naturally. Having that in view, Venturinha’s last step is 
into what he calls the “moral-epistemological debate”, where 
he searches for another answer, adequate to skeptical vertigo. 
 
I agree with Pritchard. […] scepticism has a 
corrosive strength that cannot be eliminated 
once and for all by means of any theoretical 
argumentation. The only way to override 
vertigo is, I shall argue in the last chapter, by 
taking a moral-epistemological attitude. 
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5. 
 
There is a lot to say about the role that Wittgenstein plays 
in this narrative. First of all, Wittgenstein does not talk about 
ontology—nor is it evident that he talks about epistemology 
as we usually understand it. The supposition of a background 
ontology that works as the unreflected support of all our 
claims in the context of our lives seems more Heideggerian 
than Wittgensteinian.23 Venturinha’s description of that as an 
alternative to Husserl makes this claim still more plausible. 
Beyond that, if Wittgenstein, in his later philosophy, still 
plays the game of building up a logico-ontological 
investigation, in a similar way to the one we find in the 
Tractatus, then the Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty 
are still in the ground inherited from Parmenides and Plato, 
and play the same game. And, instead of proposing a 
reticulated foundation, it is, also, a foundationalist 
investigation.24 
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty presents the context of our lives 
as what assures that our language is meaningful. But he does 
not present that as a transcendental condition, or as an 
ontology of everyday life (the ontology that there must be to 
make language meaningful). The distinction between 
justification and meaning, between epistemology and logic, is 
central: Wittgenstein is not asking what justifies an assertion, 
but what assures (or justifies, in a non-epistemological sense) 
                                                     
23 It may also be related to P. Strawson’s conceptions about 
ordinary language; for a criticism of the supposition that Strawson 
and Wittgenstein have similar conceptions about the 
epistemological status of ordinary language, see Bento Prado Jr. 
2017, 25-65.  
24 But, maybe, the idea of “groundless” is the counterpart of the 
autonomous practices that we find in the end beyond our 
justifications; cf. Wittgenstein 1974, §§ 128-131. 
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its use. This does not mean that the Philosophical Investigations 
and On Certainty are not dealing with epistemology (or 
ontology) at all, but that it affects epistemology only 
“negatively”: it implies that some epistemological claims are 
the result of mistaken conceptions about language. In this 
sense, Descartes’s dream argument and cogito do not present 
meaningful problems or alternatives; they are not meaningful 
propositions.25  
Venturinha presents pertinent remarks about the 
difficulties that face classical contextualism. And Description 
of Situations is really inventive in the alternative it proposes: 
the recourse to a Heideggerian-Wittgensteinian “natural 
ontology” that is the foundation of any foundation, the 
evidence for any evidence; and the idea that it exists in the 
context of our everyday life as a system, and that it implies 
that we live, believe and judge together with others. It avoids 
the emptiness of the idea of a contract, and the abstract 
relativism that follows from that. But, in the end, how can 
we be sure that our ontology is the natural ontology? How to 
avoid the relativistic objection that there may be as many 
ontologies as there are “forms of life” (whatever that is)? 
Why can we not ask about the evidence for the last evidence 
presented by Venturinha’s contextualism, and repeat that ad 
infinitum?  
Behind all these problems, the main question is to know 
if the old search for what there is as an ontological condition 
for our words is the adequate starting point for a 
philosophical investigation. Maybe it is not. Maybe, in the 
beginning, there is “not a Something, but not a Nothing 
either!” (Wittgenstein 2009, § 304), only deeds, and 
                                                     
25 A very original and relevant debate about the relationship 
between Wittgenstein’s remarks in On Certainty and Descartes’s 
arguments in the first and second Meditations can be found in Bento 
Prado Jr. 2004, 77-107; see also Carvalho 2018. 
 Book Symposium: Nuno Venturinha. Description of Situations 201 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 43, n. 3, pp. 164-258, Jul.-Sep. 2020. 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy is, really, the opposite of Socrates 
(cf. Wittgenstein and Waismann 2003 [TS 302], 33) in 
departing from the game of searching for final 





                                                     
26 “Im Anfang war die Tat.” Goethe, Faust, quoted by Wittgenstein 
1974, § 402. 
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João Vergílio Gallerani Cuter - Don’t Forget the Tractatus 
 
It is possible that any theory of truth as correspondence 
should be condemned as a promise of realism that only 
delivers this or that variety of relativism. After all, if truth is 
to be conceived as a correspondence between something and 
something else, and if the two poles of this relation are 
inevitably locked in a universe which is essentially individual, 
historical, cultural or human, then all our claims to 
knowledge will not be entitled to go beyond those same 
limits. Knowledge will be only that “most arrogant and 
mendacious minute of world history” described by 
Nietzsche—an invention of “clever beasts” living in some 
“out of the way corner of the universe” (1979, 79). If 
everything that a correspondence between two things has to 
offer is this kind of prison, it is better to translate it more 
sincerely in terms of convenience, economy, usefulness or 
the power to enforce it on people weaker than us. 
For consider a bat, and what is it like to be one. In a 
certain sense, each bat “knows” how to find its way out of 
the cave, and “knows” how to avoid collision with any other 
member of the cloud. But how could we ascribe such a piece 
of knowledge to a bat, if we are not able to find a place for 
what we call “cave”, “collision” and “bat” in its own world? 
Moreover, how could we ascribe any objective knowledge to 
us, if our perspective is just “human”, if we live in a human 
world instead of living as a bat does in its cave? And how can 
there be a place for objective truth if truth is conceived in 
terms of correspondence between an essentially human 
thought and an essentially human world? 
These are some of the questions that led many people to 
invite us to forget about the “correspondence theory of 
truth”—and I think Nuno Venturinha (2018) is one of them. 
On different grounds (although in the same spirit), the same 
invitation was made by David Lewis (2001) almost twenty 
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years ago. Lewis’s reasoning turns around a basic question. 
What should we take to be the fact to which a true 
proposition is supposed to “correspond”? If we say, like 
Frege, that a fact is a “true proposition” (1993, 50)27 but, 
unlike Frege, we still want to stick to the notion of 
correspondence, we are left with an empty formula: a 
proposition is true if it “corresponds” to... itself. On this 
reading the correspondence theory, as Lewis says, “doesn’t 
even get as far as the redundancy theory” (2001, 277). If we 
want to have any hope of going beyond the limits of 
redundancy, we have to take facts to be different from true 
propositions. At this point, “Tractarian facts” make their 
entrance. They are not true propositions, although each of 
them is responsible for the truth of at least one proposition, 
viz. the proposition affirming the occurrence of that fact—
in this sense, facts are “truth-makers”. But “there are also 
things which are not Tractarian facts” (ibid., 278), and the 
existence of things which are not facts would be a truth-
maker for the proposition I quoted at the beginning of this 
sentence. So, we do not seem to have a theory of truth as 
“correspondence to facts”. It is just a theory of truth as 
correspondence to… truth-makers. Moreover, says Lewis, 
the theory does not even seem to be about truth. It is “a 
theory of all manner of things” (278)—as many things as 
there are biconditionals expressing truth-conditions in terms 
of the theory. What does it mean to say, for instance, that it 
is true that cats purr? According to the theory, it means to 
affirm the existence of something “such that the existence of 
that thing implies that cats purr” (278)—something different 
from the mere purring of cats, if we do not want to go back 
to the initial situation, transforming correspondence into 
                                                     
27 “Was ist eine Tatsache? Eine Tatsache ist ein Gedanke, der wahr 
ist.” “Gedanke” is the name given by Frege to what Lewis would 
call “proposition”.  
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redundancy under disguise. If we want to have something 
that really is stronger than redundancy we should forget 
about the idea of correspondence. That is Lewis’s argument 
(as I read it). 
In the following paragraphs I will try to show (i) that what 
Lewis calls a “Tractarian fact” has nothing to do with the 
notion of “fact” we find in the Tractatus, (ii) that the 
Tractarian notion of correspondence is completely immune 
to Lewis’s criticisms, and (iii) that, pace Nuno Venturinha, it 
does not involve any kind of relativism. I don’t claim the 
Tractarian notion of truth as correspondence is right or even 
tenable (I do not think that it is). I just claim that we need 
better reasons to dismiss it.  
The Tractatus has the most radical conception of truth as 
“correspondence” that was ever formulated in the history of 
philosophy. It is at least arguable that any conception of truth 
as correspondence more radical than the Tractarian one 
would amount to identifying facts with true propositions, as 
Frege had done. Indeed, a true proposition (a true Thought) 
in the Tractatus is partially identical with its truth-maker, i.e. 
with the fact that makes it true. Let us remember some basic 
Tractarian notions.  
A state of affairs is a “combination (Verbindung) of 
objects” (Wittgenstein 1961, 2.01), and objects have as part 
of their internal properties (2.01231) a number of 
combinatorial possibilities and impossibilities (2.0123). 
Elementary propositions are immediate combinations of 
names (4.22), and each name incorporates in the form of 
syntactical rules the combinatorial possibilities of the object 
it names (3.334). We do not see this combinatorial order in 
the superficial structure of our everyday languages, but it will 
be seen once the logical analysis of any language is carried 
out to the end. What will be found exactly? First of all, the 
totality of names (logically proper names) out of which any 
elementary proposition could be built. Once this totality of 
 Book Symposium: Nuno Venturinha. Description of Situations 205 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 43, n. 3, pp. 164-258, Jul.-Sep. 2020. 
names is given, the logical form of each name must also be 
given immediately, i.e. not as an addition, but as part of its 
logical nature. This has several consequences.  
First, a name can never be given in isolation. It must be 
given together with its combinatorial possibilities with all other 
names—both those than can be combined with it in 
elementary propositions and those that cannot be so 
combined. So when a single name is given the totality of 
logically proper names must be given with it. So to speak, we 
do not reach names one by one. We either have all names 
given at once, or we would never be able to identify anything 
as a Tractarian name. Second, as an immediate consequence, 
if a single name is given, then the totality of elementary 
propositions (i.e. immediate connections of names) must be 
given, and so (third consequence) the whole of logical space 
must be given. Fourth, as each name is given with the object 
it names, the totality of objects must also be given, as well as 
(fifth) the totality of possible combinations of objects into 
states of affairs—the logical space we have just mentioned, 
now seen from the perspective of the objects.  
These five “theses” taken together give us the radical 
notion of isomorphism which is characteristic of the 
Tractatus. For each name, there must exist one and exactly 
one object, and vice versa. The same can be said about 
elementary propositions, on the one side, and states of 
affairs, on the other. So the totality of elementary sentences 
is a logical mirror, not of the world, but of the totality of 
combinatorial possibilities out of which any possible world 
can be seen as a possible “choice”. If logical syntax allows a 
combination of names to form an elementary proposition, 
there must be a corresponding possible state of affairs, and 
the occurrence of this state of affairs will make that 
proposition true quite independently of the contingent 
production of any kind of propositional sign by someone, 
sometime, somewhere, somehow. As it was just said, once 
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one elementary proposition is given, all elementary 
propositions must be also given, although of course no 
corresponding sign occurs as a fact in the world. To use the 
Tractarian jargon, only the symbol is logically necessary, the 
sign is just a contingent fact like any other—a noise, a 
scribble, a gesture that certain animals use in their daily life. 
Only the symbol is necessarily given; the sign, as any other 
fact, can occur and can also not occur. Usually, it doesn’t.  
Without this very strong notion of isomorphism, we have 
anything in the world except a Tractarian fact. But, can’t we 
affirm the existence of many things over and above states of 
affairs? In order to speak about “states of affairs”, is it not 
necessary to presuppose the existence of objects as 
components of those states of affairs, and also the existence 
of a logical form which must be present both in the 
elementary proposition and in the possible state of affairs 
that, occurring, makes that proposition true? Lewis passes 
over the Tractarian answer, although it is essential to the 
Tractarian picture of language, and to the notion of 
correspondence that comes with it. Wittgenstein says that it 
is logically necessary to presuppose, but logically impossible 
to affirm the existence of those “things”. When he wrote the 
Tractatus, he thought that logic alone was enough to show us 
that there must be logically simple names (this was the 
ultimate lesson to be drawn from Russell’s theory of 
descriptions), that they must name logically simple objects, 
that elementary propositions were immediate combinations 
of names (given the compositional account of propositional 
sense), and that to each possible combination of objects 
there must correspond a possible combination of names 
affirming its occurrence (given the isomorphism between 
world and language). He believed that all this could be shown 
by logic alone, but could not be said by any language—if we 
assume the Tractarian point of view, we are bound to admit 
that logical analysis, once it is carried out, would show that 
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many sentences of this text, as all sentences of the Tractatus, 
are neither tautologies/contradictions nor truth-functions of 
elementary propositions. These sentences are just scribbles 
which have some use, as the scribbles left by the 
philosophers had always been used in academic discussions 
without having any sense. They are nonsense in spite of 
being governed by human rules of human languages. We 
have a “feeling of sense” when we use it—the feeling that 
we are describing something. We can even be “guided” by 
that feeling, acting in this or that way—this is what happens, 
for instance, when we analyze language according to what we 
“feel” to be the “principles of analysis”. It will be impossible 
to “justify” or “ground” our actions. We will just show a 
practical adherence to the laws of logic, which includes a 
refusal to quantify over “false objects”, like Socrates. 
The distinction between saying and showing is central to 
the Tractatus, and should also be central to any account of 
“Tractarian facts”. We do not find a trace of it in Lewis 
account of correspondence. As a matter of fact, the 
distinction is just the necessary consequence of what was 
once seen as the most convenient and even intuitive results 
of the Tractatus: the idea that (i) there is a sharp and mutually 
exclusive distinction between necessary and contingent 
propositions, that (ii) all necessary propositions are either 
contradictions or tautologies, and that (iii) tautologies (in 
contrast to all other true propositions) are not true by virtue 
of some fact, but only by virtue of their logical form, and so 
they do not say anything about anything at all—they are 
“senseless”. Anyone who assumes these Tractarian theses 
will only be able to avoid something like the distinction 
between saying and showing by denying two other ideas that 
are not exclusively Tractarian: (iv) the idea that different 
languages are different manifestations of “the” Language, 
being different ways of expressing one all-encompassing 
“realm of sense” and (v) the idea that the sense of 
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propositions must fulfill necessary (logical) “conditions of 
possibility”, whatever they are. These conditions of 
possibility (v) would have to be expressed in sentences of 
“the” Language (iv). If they are to say something, they cannot 
be tautologies (iii), but then they cannot be necessary (ii), and 
so they cannot be propositions (i). Express the conclusion as 
you want. Wittgenstein’s choice was to express it “saying” 
that those conditions of possibility cannot be said, but are 
shown to anyone who does logical analysis in the only possible 
way.  
If we do not deprive the Tractatus of (i) the isomorphism 
between world and language and (ii) the distinction between 
what can be said and what can only be shown, then Lewis’s 
criticisms are clearly misguided as far as Wittgenstein is 
concerned. They may apply to many conceptions of truth as 
correspondence, but not to its main and most radical version. 
Of course, Wittgenstein would agree that, in addition to 
facts, “there are also things which are not Tractarian facts”—
this is the case, for instance, of objects and logical forms. But 
he would also establish a sharp division between the 
occurrence of a fact and the “existence” of objects and 
forms. This latter is not a fact, but a logical condition for the 
description of facts. As such, it cannot be described by any 
proposition, and so it cannot be a fact or “truth-maker”. The 
sentence “there are things which are not facts” would not be 
counted as a proposition, but as a nonsense which may have 
practical effects in the language games we play.28 One can 
find this paradoxical (and it is assumedly so), but one cannot 
ignore it while speaking about “Tractarian facts”.  
As to the claim that the “theory is not about truth”, since 
the word “truth” disappears from the biconditionals used to 
make truth equivalent to something else, this is exactly what 
                                                     
28 Even the barking of a dog or the purring of a cat has predictable 
effects. 
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we should expect from a Tractarian point of view. A 
proposition describes a fact, but the sense of a proposition 
is not an additional fact that could be described by it (or by 
any other proposition)—the sense is shown by the 
proposition, not described by it. This showing is not a 
gratuitous claim that can be dispensed with without further 
examination as if Wittgenstein were just begging a 
comfortably ineffable question. It is grounded on the notion 
of isomorphism: the proposition puts us in front of a logical 
copy of the fact that, occurring, would make it true. So it is 
quite understandable that the word “truth” disappears under 
analysis—there is no fact behind it, no concept to be defined, 
not even an object to be named. Its only function in our 
language is to call our attention to a formal concept by means 
of sentences which, under analysis, will either collapse into 
tautologies or be exposed as nonsense. We could even admit 
that the biconditionals expressing truth-conditions are (as 
Lewis says) about “all manner of things”, but they are not 
about anything over and above the purring of cats, or (even 
worse) behind it. When we say that it is true that cats purr, 
we are talking about cats. Wittgenstein is just claiming that 
although we cannot have verbal access to the sense of 
propositions, we can have nonverbal access to it. That is exactly 
what we do when we understand them or compare them 
with reality. This is not a philosophical monster, and should 
not be taken as such. Quite the contrary. It is just the natural 
consequence of some very general principles which are too 
easily accepted by philosophers who are not always inclined 
to stick to them no matter where they could lead us.  
What about relativism? Here we come across the most 
interesting point of the debate. Could we find any kind of 
relativism hidden in the Tractatus? Is the strong notion of 
truth as correspondence that we find in the book locked into 
the solipsist sphere of a transcendental subject which makes 
 Venturinha, N.; Carvalho, M.; Cuter, J. V. G.; Silva, M.; Dall´Agnol, D.  210 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 43, n. 3, pp. 164-258, Jul.-Sep. 2020. 
language my language, and the world my world? Is this 
solipsist sphere a prison? 
Once again, we must remember the characteristic 
radicalism of the Tractarian project keeping in mind its two 
landmarks: the isomorphism between world and language 
and the opposition between saying and showing. Let us 
imagine that "𝑓𝑎" and "𝑓𝑏" are elementary propositions. 
They are both values of the same prototype 𝜑𝑥, and so they 
share the same logical form—something that in Russellian 
terms we could describe as the ascription of a “first order 
property” to an “individual”. Now let us suppose that "𝑓𝑎" 
is true and "𝑓𝑏" is false. This can only be possible because in 
spite of having the same logical form they mean different 
things. The difference is obviously given by the names "𝑎" 
and "𝑏", each one meaning a different object. Logical form 
is not enough to tell us which is which. It is only through the 
association between names and objects that we have the 
difference of meaning that allows us to say that the first 
proposition is true, since it corresponds to a fact, while the 
second proposition is false. The passage from the prototype 
𝜑𝑥 to a specific proposition needs more than mere 
isomorphism (i.e. shared logical form); it needs the 
distinction between the name "𝑎" and the name "𝑏", and that 
is something that only some kind of intentionality can do. 
The sign "𝑎" must be meant as the name of the object 𝑎, and 
not of the object 𝑏, by a subject of representation which is 
not part of the represented world. This is one of the reasons 
Wittgenstein had to postulate the existence of a metaphysical 
subject as a “limit” of the world (5.632, 5.633) (cf. Cuter 
2003). Notice that the subject is a limit of the world—it is 
not “outside” it. This difference is crucial.  
Strictly speaking, there is nothing “outside” the world in 
the Tractatus. Everything which is not in the world can only 
exist as a “limit” of it—a condition of possibility for 
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representation of any world, no matter what. As a condition 
of possibility of the propositional sense, a “limit” is always 
something that can be only shown. It cannot be described.  
Take objects for instance. They cannot be found “alone” 
in the world. A state of affairs is an immediate concatenation 
of objects, and when it occurs we could say that the 
concatenated objects are “exemplified”29 in that world, but 
not that they “are out there”, as tables and books would be. 
Tables and books could not exist, while objects have a 
necessary existence, be they “exemplified” in states of affairs 
or not. Without logically simple objects we could not have 
logically simple names, elementary propositions, or language 
in general. Objects are conditions of possibility for the 
existence of language and, in this sense, they are conditions 
of possibility for any world that any language could ever 
describe. They are a “limit” of the world—any world—a nec 
plus ultra without whose presence no world can be conceived. 
The same could be said of logical forms, logical 
operations,30 propositional senses and also of the 
transcendental subject: they are all limits of the world. No 
world can be conceived without them and, for this very 
reason, they cannot be conceived as constituents of any 
world. Their existence is shown by the impossibility of 
conceiving representation in general without them, but for 
this very reason they cannot be represented, they cannot be 
said. They are ineffably necessary—conditions of possibility 
                                                     
29 Wittgenstein does not use this concept. I am using it to make my 
point clear.  
30 No world could be conceived without negation—not even the 
possible world in which all elementary propositions are true. The 
proposition which describes a fact must be conceived as the 
contradictory of the proposition negating the same fact. It is part 
of the “logical identity” of a state of affairs to make false the 
proposition denying its occurrence.  
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of any representation—and so they are “transcendental”. 
But they are not “outside” the world, since the Tractarian 
world has no outside. There is nothing to be said about the 
“outside” of the world, and nothing to be silent either. We 
can go to the limits of language and “see” them, but there is 
nothing to be “seen” beyond them. That is how I think the 
metaphor of the limit should be read. 
Wittgenstein says (6.41) that both “the sense of the 
world” [der Sinn der Welt] and any absolute value must lie 
outside the world—outside “all happening and being-so”. 
But this is subordinated to the statement that “all 
propositions are of equal value” (6.4), and must be read 
accordingly. Wittgenstein cannot be speaking here of truth-
values, for propositions do not have the same truth-value. 
They are either true or false. He must be speaking of ethical 
and aesthetical values. The occurrence of p must be as 
“desirable” as the occurrence of not-p. Of course, this is not 
true from a psychological perspective, since we are often 
inclined to wish that p, instead of not-p. We could say the 
same about any shared viewpoint—be it social, familiar, 
religious, etc.—in so far as it shows a preference for some 
facts instead of others. The will that is linked to our shared 
or individual preferences is just a fact among facts and has 
as much absolute value as the opposite desire, viz. none. 
There is no obstacle to describing this psychological will as 
a fact. It is as mundane as a headache. But Wittgenstein talks 
(6.43) about the Will as the bearer of the Ethical [als Träger 
des Ethischen]—a non-psychological Will which can be Good 
or Bad, Happy or Unhappy in an absolute sense. I can only 
conceive the Good non-psychological Will as a metaphysical 
subject contemplating the world sub specie aeterni and 
accepting it as it is. The “Happy Subject” takes in the world 
as if it were the product of the Will of God, the outcome of 
a perfect choice guided by absolute values that would be 
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outside the world.31 But this subject itself is not “outside” 
the world. It is the same subject that projects names into 
objects and builds more complex propositions out of simpler 
ones. It is a condition of possibility of the propositional 
sense, and, as such, it is a limit of the world.32 
There is no place here to speak about something similar 
to the Kantian “Ding an sich”—there is not even the 
motivation of a representation conceived as the meeting 
point of an active and a passive contribution, this latter 
announcing, so to speak, a “foreign realm” which is beyond 
the boundaries of human knowledge. Nothing is announced 
by the Tractarian bounds of sense except the realm of 
propositions and the realm of possible facts that make them 
true or false. Logic does not show us anything over and 
above that.  
The immediate consequence is that the point of view of 
the transcendental subject is not relative to “this subject” as 
opposed to any other. There is only one possible 
transcendental subject—only one possible source of sense. 
You may call it “solipsistic subject” if you want, but do not 
forget that this is not part of a skeptical narrative in which 
we are asking about the existence of “other minds”. The 
subject is not a mind. It has no history, no structure, no 
desires, no tendencies, no capacities. It can be seen as an 
intentional subject, but its intentionality has nothing to do 
with any psychological faculty—something that I can have 
more or less, train to improve, or lose in old age. 
Wittgenstein is not considering the logical possibility of 
being alone in the world—he is rather stating the logical 
                                                     
31 “Wenn es einen Wert gibt, der Wert hat, so muss er außerhalb 
alles Geschehens und So-Seins liegen” (Wittgenstein 1961, 6.41, 
my emphasis). 
32 See Cuter 2012 for details. 
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impossibility of being accompanied by any other source of 
sense. As far as language is concerned, the transcendental 
subject is not “alone”. It is a logical singularity. As objects 
are essentially many (since a single state of affairs is the 
concatenation of at least two objects), the transcendental 
subject is essentially one. 
Of course, this is quite radical. As I said, I think it is the 
most radical version of the correspondence theory that was 
ever conceived: a world essentially linked to a transcendental 
subject that can only articulate propositions showing in their 
own structure how the world is if they are true. It is radical, 
it is strange, it is untenable perhaps. It is guilty of all kinds of 
sins, but not of relativism. It is perhaps the best example we 
have of the exorbitant price that we must pay when we are 
not ready to admit at least some degree of relativism linked 




                                                     
33 I want to thank Robert Vinten for the corrections he suggested 
and for a critical remark he made, which I tried to some extent to 
account for. 
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Marcos Silva - On the Epistemology of Logic: Logical Principles as 
Hinge Propositions 
 
Venturinha’s new book Description of Situations: An Essay 
in Contextualist Epistemology deals with an impressively wide 
range of themes and contains several penetrating ideas in few 
more than 100 pages. At first sight, his book seems rather 
like a set of short thought-provoking essays on basically 
everything: from language to ethics, from contemporary 
epistemology to metaphysics. It also includes some sharp 
comments about great authors from the history of 
philosophy, such as Aristotle, Descartes and Kant. 
A first look at the summary already calls our attention to 
the variety and relevance of the topics in such a short book. 
The references in the work include major figures from 
contemporary philosophy but they are always placed in 
dialogue with figures from the history of philosophy. It also 
builds a seminal and welcome bridge between the 
continental tradition (e.g. Husserl, Heidegger, and Ricoeur) 
and analytical philosophy (e.g. Frege, Quine and Davidson). 
The book is a good example of how to take both traditions 
seriously in order to make advances in contemporary 
philosophy. 
I am sympathetic to Venturinha’s contextualist main line 
of thought which opens and guides his book. His book 
“takes as its point of departure the fact that we are situated 
beings. Every single moment in our lives is already given 
within the framework of a specific context in the midst of 
which we understand ourselves and what surrounds us.” 
(Venturinha 2018, ix)  
But while the book is a great survey of relevant work in 
epistemology and theory of knowledge, it does not mention 
discussions of the nature of logic and its principles and the 
possibility of their revision. It does not address recent 
investigations of logical revision and logical pluralism which 
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could enrich and be enriched by its contextualist proposal. 
The silence about philosophy and epistemology of logic is 
pretty pregnant, given the book’s presumption. Even in the 
first chapter entitled “Language and Reasoning” a more 
detailed discussion of logic would have been welcome. Since 
Venturinha’s contextualist book says little about logic I 
would like to propose making a connection between two 
themes that are important for his account, namely hinge 
epistemology and social dependency in the construction of 
normativity. In chapter 11, called “Social Dependency”, 
Venturinha elaborates on Pritchard’s influential 
Wittgensteinian approach against radical skeptics (Pritchard 
2012, 2016) by emphasizing the “groundlessness of our 
believing”. In chapter 12, “Moral Matters”, Venturinha 
maintains that hinge epistemology can be applied to moral 
discussions: “Here we can see that in a moral scenario there 
is no room for an epistemic vertigo. Not even the deepest 
modal uncertainty dissolves my moral conscience. Like 
hinges, our moral commitments prevail.” (Venturinha 2018, 
91) 
In this short contribution, I would like to assess the 
viability of equating logic and hinge epistemology 
compatible with Venturinha’s contextualist proposal. 
 
 
1. EPISTEMOLOGY OF LOGIC AND THE VERY 
POSSIBILITY OF LOGICAL REVISION 
 
Brouwer’s intuitionist program, as presented in his 
historic PhD Thesis (1907) and, then, in his paper “The 
unreliability of the logical principles” (1908), shows a 
genuine philosophical motivation for revising logical 
principles and not just for engineering or tinkering with 
symbols and a plethora of formal calculi. In Heyting’s 
intuitionist systems (1928, 1930), which develop Brouwer’s 
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thinking, an inference rule is valid if a construction can be 
found that makes true the statement that is obtained by 
applying the rule. What the principles of logic need to 
preserve is therefore not, as in classical logic, mind-
independent truth, but mental constructibility. Various 
principles of classical logic, most notably the Principle of the 
Excluded Middle, then become insufficiently grounded. 
The unreasonableness of the classical Principle of 
Explosion also presents compelling grounds for revising 
logical principles, as it becomes problematic to derive every 
single possible sentence from a contradiction (Da Costa 
1958, 1959). It suffices to have a contradiction to lead to an 
explosive consequence relation in those systems. We must 
though distinguish trivialization from contradiction. In fact, 
the problem in rational domains should not be the existence 
of contradictions but the occurrence of an explosive relation 
of logical consequence. In some rational discussions or in 
some important domains of our lives, when we are dealing 
with beliefs and information, we do encounter 
contradictions and go on reasoning nevertheless. In science 
some theories could be inconsistent without being trivial 
(Priest, Tanaka, and Weber 2018). 
These philosophical objections to the nature and scope 
of classical logical orthodoxy have paved the way for the 
emergence of two major non-classical logics, respectively, 
intuitionist and paraconsistent logics. They have several 
important philosophical and technical implications for 
mathematics and computation (Carnielli and Rodrigues 
2015a, 2015b). 
We should take the current plurality of non-classical 
logics as a serious philosophical question, that is, as 
something that calls for an explanation and forces us to 
reconsider the very role and purpose of logic. Two extreme 
views prevent us from engaging with the philosophical 
possibility of a plurality of alternative logics, one of which 
 Venturinha, N.; Carvalho, M.; Cuter, J. V. G.; Silva, M.; Dall´Agnol, D.  218 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 43, n. 3, pp. 164-258, Jul.-Sep. 2020. 
has it that logic is some metaphysical endeavor with 
sophisticated intellectual tools capable of discovering 
independent abstract structures, while the other maintains 
that logic is basically an empty game governed by ad hoc and 
arbitrary decisions.  
This scenario, in fact, offers us a relevant general 
epistemological problem concerning the nature of logic and 
the very possibility of revision of its principles and most 
basic rules. One can question whether it is possible to choose 
the correct set of logical rules and if so, how it is to be done. 
In other words, how could we rationally justify our logical 
principles, if the very possibility of rational justification 
presupposes them? In fact, a cluster of epistemological 
questions can be envisioned here: How should we argue 
about a basic set of rules of inference or logical principles? 
Which rational arguments could be used to convince a litigant 
that a set of basic rules is the correct one, if any argument 
has to be, from the beginning, based on a set of accepted 
inferential rules? These are questions concerning the very 
nature of logic and rationality and the viability of their 
justification. They have to do with the question of how 
reason can be used to ground the most basic principles of 
reason without circularity or infinite regress. In other words, 
is there a rational way of convincing someone of such a 
fundamental thing as a logical principle?  
According to Bueno and Colyvan (2004), for instance, the 
emergence of non-classical logics motivates the revision of 
several classical and epistemologically attractive features of 
logic and its centrality for rationality and our daily lives. 
Indeed, views that take logic to be absolute, eternal, a priori, 
or universal have been severely challenged in recent decades. 
Concerning these difficulties Bueno and Colyvan state:  
 
One of the reasons that philosophy of logic is 
such a difficult enterprise is that, in order to 
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advance debates in this area, we require the 
very thing we are studying: logic. This difficulty 
is especially acute when engaging in the 
business of theory choice in logic. After all, in 
order to decide between two logical theories, 
we need to put forward evidence and 
arguments for each. This evidence and these 
arguments will need to be assessed, and the 
assessment will need to be conducted in the 
context of some logic or other. But how do we 
choose this latter logic? We appear to be 
headed for an infinite regress. (Ibid., 156)  
 
Note that Agrippa’s famous skeptical trilemma which 
challenges every single attempt to ground our justifications 
and beliefs epistemologically may also be applied in this 
context. According to Agrippa any chain of justification for 
our beliefs and theories will eventually face three main 
problems. First, as presented in the quote above, once we 
step into the inquiry about the nature of logical principles 
and how to justify them, an infinite regress threatens us. 
While we could avoid it by accepting a self-evident axiom or 
something similar, this strategy might be viewed as arbitrary 
or dogmatic by a skeptic. Another way out is to propose that 
beliefs and justifications should mutually ground each other. 
However if we use a net of evidence that should ground each 
other, a skeptic may attack it pointing out that this would 
entail circularity. Arbitrariness in the stipulation of a first 
axiom, circularity and infinite regress are skeptical challenges 
encountered by foundationalists in epistemology, and they 
also occur in the discussion concerning the justification of 
our logical principles. 
The main agenda of contemporary discussions 
concerning the revision of logic, one compatible with 
Venturinha’s contextualism, should be to develop a 
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philosophical theory of logical inference that explains the 
rules and pragmatic nature of rationality and logic itself by 
giving centrality to and developing the following working 
hypothesis: that the alleged logical laws should legitimately 
be taken, from a situated point of view, as a set of rules 
embedded in and governing our discursive practices in a 
determined public sphere. In other words, logical principles 
should be taken as rules with normative power that 
constitute and correct our practices in a public discursive 
sphere of individuals in dynamical exchanges in 
communities. Thus, proofs can be seen as dialogues between 
“opponents” in which the applicant introduces a thesis and 
the opponent tries to systematically block the establishment 
of the truth of the theory, as argued in recent work by Dutilh 
Novaes (2013, 2015), and Brandom (1994, 2000). In this 
social perspective, logic should be taken as a set of 
argumentative practices in which participants have different 
goals, recovering the very meaning of debates in ancient 
Greek democracy. Thus, a logical proof, before being 
conceived as a tool to establish eternal truths, can represent 
a finite and sequential itinerary of a situated discourse to 
convince an audience. Truth is established by persuasion 
resulting from the steps justified by public rules and not by 
an eminent transcendent truth of our practices. In this 
context, rules, agreements, and stipulations play the role of 
objective correction of discourse, which in a realist approach 
is guaranteed by impersonal truths, independent of our 
inferential practices. In a contextualist view, a realist 
approach to logic should be avoided as it blocks any revision 
of logic and prevents the emergence of a greater plurality of 
non-classical logics with different aims, scopes and 
applicability. 
If we adopt logical principles as rules regulating our 
activities, setting rules and criteria to evaluate what is 
legitimate or illegitimate, we must note that we are dealing, 
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in this perspective, fundamentally with situated 
deontological notions, as authorizations and prohibitions, 
that allow, restrict or guide our field of action or space of 
maneuver (Spielraum). As a result, it is crucial to observe in 
this context that rules normatively determine the criteria by 
which we judge the quality of our actions and descriptions. 
Accordingly, rules themselves can be neither true nor false, 
as they lay down criteria for our evaluation of something as 
true or as false. Thus, it makes no sense to say that a standard 
or a logical principle is true or false. However, note that 
reference systems could have been different and can change 
over time according to pragmatic and environmental 
pressures. 
For the completeness of Venturinha’s contextualist line 
of thought, it is also crucial to take logic as a human 
enterprise: Formal logic (reasoning using general principles) 
should be ultimately based on our actual discursive practices 
and informal logic (local and correct reasoning). The 
problem of revision of logic concerns neither formal logic, 
nor the application of logic to natural sciences, but daily 
homespun reasoning. The primary locus of normativity and 
meaning should be our daily life, our regular daily inferences. 
Here it is important to emphasize the constitutive social 
dimension of logic, the absorption of rules by observation 
and instruction, and the possibility of mutual correction in 
communal regulative practices that presuppose training 
(inculcation and immersion in a human community). 
 
 
2. LOGICAL PRINCIPLES AS HINGE PROPOSITIONS 
 
By combining further insights found in Wittgenstein 
(1974), Dutilh Novaes (2013, 2015, 2016) and Venturinha 
(2018) we can motivate a contextualist approach to tackle the 
problem of deep disagreement about revision of logic by 
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offering a non-foundationalist proposal for the nature of 
logic. The emphasis, for making revision of logic possible 
without engaging in a metaphysical endeavor, should not be 
put on the investigation of any deep and hidden laws of 
nature or reality, but on some kind of reflexive equilibrium 
of human practices based on linguistic and social 
interactions, that is on the dynamical association between 
forms of lives and logical principles as hinge propositions. It 
is a false dichotomy to think that we must understand logic 
as being either the manipulation of empty signs or as being 
grounded in the reality of things. The foundation should be 
social and stable or regular enough. It should have normative 
power, that is, it should be used by us to correct deviant cases. 
In this vein, we have good reasons for introducing Hinge 
epistemology or Moorean propositions (Coliva 2015; Moyal-
Sharrock 2016; Pritchard 2012, 2016) into the context of 
revision of logic. Moore connects “I know” with several 
different empirical propositions to challenge 
idealism/skepticism. Some examples of these propositions 
are: “I am a human being”, “there are other human beings”, 
“I have a brain“, “I’ve never been off our planet”, “I’ve 
never been on the moon”, “I have two hands” “here it is a 
hand”, “Every human being has a brain”. Wittgenstein, in his 
On Certainty (1974) questions how we learn those “truths”. 
The truth of Moore’s propositions is certainly not a priori and 
it is not guaranteed by empirical verification. They do not 
seem to rely on any formal induction either, because they are 
not based on a mere generalization (or if so with very few 
specimens). 
Two properties of these “hinge” propositions are 
immediately apparent for Wittgenstein. First, they are 
required in order to investigate the truth of other claims and, 
secondly, they are exempt from doubt. We do not usually 
articulate those “truths” and do not really accept their 
(logically) possible falsehood. Yet, central to all of them is 
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the idea that they function as “hinges” that play a peculiar, 
rule-like role (ibid., § 95) which ultimately makes them 
immune to skeptical assaults while also divesting them of the 
status of knowledge. Accordingly, propositions like “Here’s 
my hand” (in Moore-like situations), “Nobody has ever been 
on the Moon” (around 1949), “The Earth has existed for a 
very long time”, “My name is MS”, “There are physical 
objects”, are rules of “evidential significance” (Wright 1985), 
or a “norm of description” (Wittgenstein 1974, §§ 167, 321). 
In other words, justification and knowledge, as well as doubt, 
are possible only within the limits set by taking hinges for 
granted, as they play a regulative, normative role. Thus, as we 
might put it, they are constitutive elements of our situated 
rationality. According to Venturinha: 
 
Hinges produce the necessary evidence to 
situate us in experience regulating what is and 
is not subjected to doubt. They immediately 
exclude any far-fetched sceptical possibility of 
global epistemological impact, not because we 
have provided grounds for its exclusion but 
rather because evidence already imposes that 
the situation turns around its own axis. 
Contrary to professed epistemic contextualists, 
Wittgenstein is not interested in laying down 
the truth-conditions of our variable knowledge 
ascriptions. For him, the most important 
contextual work to be done in epistemology is 
to shed light on the thereness of our evidence. 
(2018, 52) 
 
I think this line of argument could also be applied to 
logic. There is also a “thereness” of our evidence in logic. 
Evidence has often been used to predicate logical principles 
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and to accommodate the changes of such principles would 
be very difficult. It is important to mention that Moore’s 
work seems to have led Wittgenstein to propositions about 
perceptional information. But it does not have to. 
Against this background, we may have a working 
threefold contextualist hypothesis: i) Logical principles 
should be treated as hinge propositions. (Although not all 
hinge propositions are logical principles). ii) They are 
determined by our education in a Weltbild. iii) Logical 
principles could be different and may change. 
Hinge propositions or Moorean propositions are not 
metaphysical. They are not descriptions. They neither share 
a common logical form (in fact, they have the form of 
empirical propositions) nor a similar semantic content. They 
are indubitable due to their peculiar function in our form of 
life. This peculiar role makes them logical. And this role 
might be changed. We are educated through and by them. As 
in radical conflicts, in logic we also have to initiate (litigant) 
people into new procedures, interests and views. The basic 
idea is that we have a foundation, but without 
foundationalism. In some scenarios and situations, the 
opposite is never considered. Something has to be solid. It is 
not a matter of a special propositional content, but rather 
our ways of acting and judging that rule certain things out of 
consideration.   
We can motivate the transition from hinge epistemology 
to logic, by stressing the analogy between hinges and logical 
principles. Both are required to investigate the sense and 
truth of other claims. They are exempt from doubt, because 
something must stand fast (otherwise we would lose our 
foothold). In systems, like logical ones, some things are 
unshakable and “absolutely solid and secure”. Note that 
hinge propositions are “obvious”, just like logical principles. 
Rejection or refusal is often taken as insane, not just false, as 
we would not let them go because they belong to things that 
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we are convinced of. As Wittgenstein puts it, “the reasonable 
man does not have certain doubts” (1974, § 220). 
In order to convey a proper contextualist account of logic 
revision, it should entail two main ideas, namely: i) 
Dynamical aspect of revision of logic and ii) two-way 
direction of normativity between logical principles and local 
reasoning. 
Some Wittgensteinian-oriented philosophers, like 
Brandom (1994, 2000) and Fogelin (1985), hold that we use 
logical principles to correct, to regulate our actions, 
perceptions, interactions, theories, information, etc. and not 
(primarily) to describe things. They use, in their account of 
logic, the antirealist tenet that logical vocabulary does not 
relate to any particular state of affairs in the world but to our 
criteria or norms to evaluate descriptions and actions in the 
world. In this vein, we might be able to develop an account 
in epistemology of logic dealing with i) and ii), as we are not 
talking about facts and truth, but about our criteria to 
evaluate facts and truth. Logical principles do not need to 
represent anything in reality. Logical systems express some 
of our public commitments and norms in daily rational 
discussions and practices. Our ruled practices, the forms we 
enact in the world, are inferentially articulated and can be 
publicly and dynamically tested and controlled.  
 
 
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Here I defended the application of hinge epistemology, 
as presented by Venturinha (2018), to the subject of revising 
logic. According to a contextualist program concerning 
logical principles, empirical propositions and logical 
propositions are not distinguished according to their 
content, nor by their logical form, but by their role in our 
Weltbild, that is, in our understanding of the world, how it 
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operates, and how we act in it. Propositions may also 
sometimes play the role of norms, as they are used to correct 
our perception and guide our actions and inquiry. As a 
consequence, the so-called normativity of logic in a 
contextualist proposal is not something tangential; it should 
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Darlei Dall’Agnol - On Venturinha’s Contextualist Moral 
Epistemology 
 
Venturinha’s book Description of Situations is an excellent 
essay on contextualist epistemology with a Wittgensteinian 
inspiration. The work deals with a wide range of 
philosophical subjects: from theoretical ones such as the 
nature of language and reasoning, theory of truth and the 
fabric of the world, determinism and free will, radical 
skepticism and whether transcendentalism is successful in 
refuting it, to more practical ones such as social dependency, 
morality, ethics, akratic actions, moral knowledge and so on. 
A short review does not permit detailed comments on each 
of these philosophical issues; therefore, I will confine myself 
to the last chapter of the book (“Moral Matters”) in order to 
better discuss whether there is moral knowledge and whether 
it is a sufficient condition for acting rightly. 
To start with, it is crucial to reconstruct the context in 
which the last chapter is situated. At the end of chapter 11, 
Venturinha, after recalling Moore and Wittgenstein’s 
discussions on certainty, shows some sympathy to 
Pritchard’s problem of epistemic vertigo, that is, the 
supposed residuum of theoretical doubt that remains even 
after serious attempts to reject radical skepticism. Much of 
the book On Certainty is a discussion of Moore’s proof of an 
external world and Wittgenstein’s own approach to it. Now, 
if we take a direct approach, the problem can be put in this 
way: the skeptic can always respond that whether Moore 
really knows there is a tree in his garden or not is ultimately 
a matter of belief only since he cannot be justified in his 
credence corresponding to anything “out there” in the 
world. Vertigo is, according to Pritchard and Venturinha, 
caused by a recognition of “the groundlessness of our 
believing” (Wittgenstein 1974, § 166). Now, Venturinha 
rejects Moyal-Sharrock’s solution, namely that vertigo is just 
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felt by the epistemologist who takes knowledge as “justified 
true belief” only, in that it neglects practical certainties such 
as knowing how to walk around the tree as one stands up 
from one’s chair and moves in the garden. As I see it, 
however, Wittgenstein would prefer an indirect approach to 
skepticism that leads to its dissolution: since the skeptic 
himself must have solid reasons to doubt, and since it is not 
possible to doubt everything (one must, for instance, take as 
grounded the meaning of words while doubting), radical 
skepticism is pragmatically self-refuting. I will not, however, 
dispute this point here. Thus, according to the author of 
Description of Situations, “The only way to override vertigo is, 
I shall argue in the last chapter, by taking a moral-
epistemological attitude” (Venturinha 2018, 87). 
Arriving at chapter 12, then, Venturinha starts by making 
the distinction between ethics (the pursuit of the good in our 
lives) and morality (what is mandatory in society to achieve 
it). He argues that context is equally determinant in this 
sphere; for instance, the moral principle “you shall not kill” 
needs to be contextualized. For example, does it apply to 
humans only or to non-human animals too? Does it relate to 
animals that are part of our diet or ones that annoy us like 
insects? Are cases of self-defense and just wars exceptions? 
Now, since morality is mandatory, there is no room for 
epistemic vertigo: “Not even the deepest modal uncertainty 
dissolves my moral conscience. Like hinges, our moral 
commitments prevail.” (Ibid., 91) That is why, according to 
the author of Description of Situations, in the end, morality 
matters deeply. 
To recognize the existence of moral hinges, Venturinha 
invites us to apply his Disclosure Principle (ibid.): imagine that 
whatever you do, even the things that only you know about, can be seen 
and would be seen by those you most care for. This thought 
experiment makes clear that moral responsibility is an 
inalienable feature of our existence and that our moral 
 Book Symposium: Nuno Venturinha. Description of Situations 229 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 43, n. 3, pp. 164-258, Jul.-Sep. 2020. 
conscience speaks to us because everything could become 
known to our dearest. So, why do we still act wrongly after 
all? 
This problem is discussed by Venturinha in the third 
section of the last chapter, on akratic actions. Since it is a 
short one, I would like to quote in its entirety here: 
 
That an agent can choose to do what she judges 
to be wrong instead of what she judges to be 
right, experiencing ethical qualms as a 
consequence, is, in the philosophy of action, a 
problem of “akrasia”—from the Greek 
,which literally means “lack of 
power”. Contrary to the Socratic perspective, 
according to which evil is only done by 
ignorance, unintentionally, the existence of 
akratic actions depends on the admission that 
they are intentional. It is exactly because the 
akratic agent can find sufficient reasons for 
doing w that she thought it would be better for 
her not to do r, even if she recognizes the latter 
as what should ultimately be done. What is at 
stake is a conflict of reasons. The Socratic 
argument is that the agent was ignorant when 
w was contemplated as a possibility and that 
under closer scrutiny r would have appeared as 
the rational decision. It is not my aim here to 
contribute to the debate on akrasia, which 
raises many other questions. […] My view is 
that the agent does not feel herself weak but 
divided. It is not because she definitely wanted 
to do r but is not strong enough to decide to 
do it that she does w. She does w for the simple 
reason that she is not absolutely sure about the 
value of r. She may be more inclined to believe that 
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doing r is better than doing w, but she does not know it. 
In fact, no one can ever claim to know something in this 
realm. The ignorance Socrates talks about can 
be identified but cannot be dispelled. As long 
as the agent has a good reason for her action, 
its legitimation is as good as any other. (Ibid., 
92; italics added) 
 
The last section of the last chapter, then, concludes that 
since the application of the r-w standard of actions can be 
fluid, “there can be no such thing as moral knowledge” (ibid., 
93). I remain, however, unconvinced that the problem of 
akratic actions shows us that a non-cognitivist approach in 
moral epistemology is the only option. In the remaining part 
of this review, therefore, I will question Venturinha’s 
contextualist moral epistemology.  
I believe it is important to make a clear distinction 
between whether there are moral dilemmas (whether to do r 
or w) and the akratic problem. What Venturinha seems to 
have primarily in mind concerns apparent dilemmas; that is, it 
concerns doubting whether there are better reasons for 
doing r instead of w. I would here like to consider his own 
example from a poet: “To you children are nothing, the flesh 
of your flesh are your poems”(ibid, 93). According to 
Venturinha, that a father is able to repudiate his children (r) only 
to serve poetry (w) seems unacceptable to us, but we can also 
form a better image of the poet who sacrifices his whole life 
for the sake of poetry. According to the author of Description 
of Situations, this example shows how fluid the application of 
r-w standards can be and, eventually, that there is no 
knowledge in the moral realm. 
Could one hold that the above conflict of reasons (r, w) 
exhibits a real moral dilemma? I do not think so. We can 
represent the logical form of real dilemmas (if there are any) 
in this way: (Op  Oq)   ◊ (p  q). To alter slightly the 
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above example: it is obligatory for the poet to do p (to take 
care of his children); it is, at the same time, obligatory to do 
q (to serve poetry), and it is not possible to do both. Thus, if 
there were some impossibility of knowing how to act, it 
would be related to the equal value of contradictory reasons. 
But this is clearly not the case, and consequently the dilemma 
is only apparent. A pseudo dilemma is just an epistemic 
difficulty for the agent since most of us (including 
Venturinha) would not consider the repudiation of one’s 
own children to be morally acceptable. Actually, the apparent 
dilemma is between choosing morality itself and an aesthetic 
way of life. No one can be under a moral obligation to write 
poetry, but all parents are under an obligation to take care of 
their children. Therefore, the apparent dilemma does not 
show that there is no moral knowledge. A law requiring the 
confused poet to provide for the basic necessities of his 
children would be morally justified.  
Could we say that the poet suffers from akrasia when he 
chooses to serve poetry? Well, this may well be the case. He 
could know that the moral obligation is to take care of his 
children, but have no strength of will to do so. That is to say, 
let us suppose that he knows, morally speaking, he must not 
repudiate his children, but that he acts differently and just 
keeps writing poetry all day long. What happened? If there 
are no moral dilemmas, the best explanation here is not that 
the poet is unsure about the r-w standard of action, but that 
he chooses w instead of r. The poet is incontinent: he knows 
what is right, but acts against it. Now, Venturinha is right to 
criticize the Socratic tradition according to which knowledge 
is sufficient to act rightly. The problem is, then, a volitive one. 
Aristotle has already shown that the phenomena of akrasia 
and of incontinence reveal that the cognitive condition is a 
necessary, but not a sufficient one. It does not follow, 
however, that there is no moral knowledge. According to the 
author of Nicomachean Ethics, knowledge is a necessary 
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condition, but a volitive one must also be fulfilled to act 
rightly. To make sense of this view, we need, of course, to 
show that there is moral knowledge.  
I would, then, like to turn now to the problem of whether 
there is moral knowledge. As it is perhaps well-known, there 
is a fierce discussion about whether Wittgenstein kept the 
non-cognitivist approach to morality he expressed in the 
Tractatus (“it is impossible for there to be propositions of 
ethics” [1961, 6.42]) in his later philosophy. According to 
Simon Blackburn (1981), this is indeed the case; for other 
authors such as John McDowell (1981), however, the late 
Wittgenstein changed his mind and his rule-following 
considerations can be used to develop a cognitivist moral 
epistemology. Now, I agree with McDowell on this point: 
there is a way of grasping a rule which results in going on doing 
the same thing. That is to say, we can act not only according to, 
but actually follow the rule. To believe or to know whether we 
are really following a rule are very distinct cognitive 
phenomena.  
Now, inspired by Wittgenstein’s grammatical 
investigations on ‘belief’, ‘knowledge’, ‘certainty’, etc. and on 
his rule-following remarks, I have developed a moral 
epistemology called “practical cognitivism”. This asserts that 
there is moral knowledge and that it is best understood as 
involving knowing-how to act. To recognize this possibility, it 
is important to recall another distinction related to the 
grammar of the word ‘to know’, which is closely related to that of 
‘can’, ‘is able to’: we say “Now I know!—and similarly “Now I 
can do it!” and “Now I understand!” (Wittgenstein 2009, §§ 
150-151). There is, then, a practical sense of ‘to know’ that 
allow us to defend a cognitivist moral epistemology. As we 
will see, moral knowledge may well be expressed both in 
moral hinge-propositions and in contingent, empirical moral 
propositions.  
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To recognize this point, let us first clarify Wittgenstein’s 
distinction between empirical and grammatical propositions. 
To say “Harm is bad in itself” is just to express a grammatical 
remark on the meaning of ‘harm’: it has intrinsic disvalue. 
This is an example of a moral grammatical proposition. Now, 
to say “do not cause physical injury”, or “psychological 
suffering is worse than pain and should also be avoided”, etc. 
is to express an empirical moral proposition. If we accept that 
it is true that harm is bad in itself, for coherence, we should 
also accept as true that we must avoid causing physical injury, 
psychological suffering, etc. to other people. A physician 
may, however, cause physical pain (e.g. through surgery) to 
save a life. Thus, an empirical moral proposition may be true 
according to the context.  
I would, however, like to go a step further and propose 
another distinction between hinge and non-hinge grammatical 
propositions. A hinge proposition sets, for instance, the 
meaning of ‘morality’ itself. An ethical principle such as 
“first, do no harm” is a hinge moral grammatical proposition, 
which allows, for example a physician to deliberate and 
decide whether a particular course of action is the right thing 
to do: if the benefits override the malefices, then the action 
is obligatory; if the harms are greater than the positive results, 
the action is morally forbidden, etc. For example, if a surgery 
restores health, it is morally obligatory; if the procedure 
would only kill the patient, it is morally forbidden, and so on. 
Now, if nothing but harm results, then the physician is morally 
bound not to act. This is the right thing to do. This seems to 
apply to any moral context. Even commonsense recognizes 
that “se não se puder fazer o bem, o mal não se faz pra 
ninguém” (Seo Chico, from the Island of Santa Catarina). 
Roman law was grounded on the same hinges: Neminem laede, 
immo omnes, quantum potes, juva! These statements express the 
grammar of ‘morality’ itself; they are hinge propositions. To 
deny them, as Wittgenstein would say, makes ‘morality’ 
 Venturinha, N.; Carvalho, M.; Cuter, J. V. G.; Silva, M.; Dall´Agnol, D.  234 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 43, n. 3, pp. 164-258, Jul.-Sep. 2020. 
simply unintelligible for members of our lifeform (Lebensform). 
I follow here the interpretation of ‘lifeform’ which says that 
sharing the human lifeform is a necessary precondition, for 
example, for communication (ibid., § 241). ‘Lifeform’, then, 
is not a naturalistic concept and this makes purely 
contextualist interpretations of Wittgenstein’s ethics 
problematic. Wittgenstein (1965) used to insist on the 
difference between absolute and relative uses of ‘good’, 
‘right’, etc. Moral rightness is not sensitive to context. That 
is to say, it seems that there are no circumstances where it 
would be morally acceptable for anyone to produce just 
harm, if nothing else results from his actions. Therefore, not 
only must a physician know-how to act; that is, he can go on 
doing the same thing (first, no harm), but we are bound also to 
hold him responsible if he does not comply with the 
requirements of morality. 
In conclusion, then, I think that we can attribute to a 
person the cognitive condition of knowledge (or the absence 
thereof), and not only beliefs, to evaluate her as a good or bad 
moral agent. To a physician whose acts do more harm than 
benefit for the patient, we will not only say that (s)he must 
know better, but we will also rightly seek the moral and legal 
conditions to hold her(him) accountable. That is why 
philosophers such as Aristotle and the late Wittgenstein, etc. 
seem to be right in holding that knowledge is a necessary, 
although not a sufficient, condition to act rightly. 
These differences between Venturinha’s contextualist 
approach and my own interpretation of Wittgenstein’s 
remarks on rule-following and on the grammar of ‘to know’ 
should only be seen as a sign that Description of Situations is an 
excellent work which made me rethink many important 
issues in moral epistemology. No doubt, Venturinha’s book 
deserves to be read and discussed by all those interested in 
philosophy and related areas. 
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Nuno Venturinha - Replies 
 
I would like first to express my deepest gratitude to all 
the contributors to this book symposium for taking the time 
to read my Description of Situations and for raising so many 
interesting questions and objections. I am sure that they 
deserve much more attention and thought than they can 
receive within the limited space of these replies, which will 
serve mainly as clarifications. 
 
 
1. REPLY TO CARVALHO 
 
 Marcelo Carvalho’s commentary is a remarkable 
attempt to summarize the vast array of themes addressed in 
my book and to make sense out of it. Carvalho shares with 
me an interest in both the analytic and the continental 
traditions looking at philosophical problems from a broad 
perspective. He understands why I want to frame the current 
debate on epistemic contextualism with analyses of issues 
that go back to Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Kant, Bolzano, 
Frege, Husserl or Wittgenstein. No matter how little these 
authors appear in the writings of typical contextualists, they 
can help us reflect on the prospects and solutions we find 
today in epistemology. This is what explains the somewhat 
kaleidoscopic nature of Description of Situations in which the 
abovementioned names and other major figures from the 
history of philosophy coexist with contemporary 
epistemologists such as Cohen, DeRose, Lewis, Pritchard, 
Sosa, Travis, Williams and Williamson. There are various 
aspects that connect them: the relationship between 
language, thought and world; the opposition between 
objectivism and subjectivism, or realism and anti-realism; 
and the link between relativism and scepticism. 
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 In this context, I was particularly surprised by 
Carvalho’s reference to Heidegger as lying, together with 
Bolzano, Frege and Husserl, “at the core of [my] book” since 
the former, contrary to the latter, does not play any role in 
my argument. While Bolzano is central in chapter 3 (“The 
Correspondence Theory of Truth”) and chapter 4 (“Reality 
in Itself”), Frege in chapter 4 and chapter 5 (“Unthought 
Thoughts”), and Husserl in chapter 10 (“Bracketing 
Modality”) and chapter 11 (“Social Dependency”), 
Heidegger is only mentioned on two single occasions: in 
chapter 8 (“Radical Scepticism”), which is devoted to 
Descartes, apropos of the scholastic distinction between 
essentia and existentia retrieved in the Meditations on First 
Philosophy (cf. Venturinha 2018, 60); and in chapter 11, which 
focuses on Husserl and the later Wittgenstein, where I call 
attention to an influence of Heidegger’s Being and Time on 
Husserl’s terminology used in the fifth of his Cartesian 
Meditations (cf. ibid., 82). In a short book like Description of 
Situations the examination must sometimes be sketchy, but in 
regard to Heidegger I do not even try to make a point. In 
fact, I consider that Heidegger’s philosophy stands 
completely outside the common ground shared by Bolzano, 
Frege and Husserl, whose views are strongly informed and 
shaped by the science of their time. We do not find this 
scientific spirit in Heidegger who just saw in Husserl’s 
phenomenology a way to explore the subjective side of 
experience, not its objective counterpart. I thus reject that 
Description of Situations promotes what Carvalho calls “a 
Heideggerian-Wittgensteinian ‘natural ontology’”. The book 
is certainly much under the influence of Wittgenstein, but 
not of Heidegger. 
As Carvalho points out several times, Wittgenstein’s later 
thought is actually the driving force of Description of Situations, 
which suggests an anti-sceptical perspective akin to that 
elaborated in On Certainty for dealing with the contextualist 
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puzzles. But Carvalho objects in an important way that there 
is not enough evidence to assume that “Wittgenstein is still 
part of [the] Platonic-Kantian debate”. Here I should remark 
that “Platonic-Kantian debate” is an expression that I never 
use in Description of Situations and chapter 9 
(“Transcendentalism”) indeed tries to show how far Kant is 
from a realist, Platonist stance. But I regard this as a mere 
detail. What comes next is more relevant for Carvalho goes 
on to say that “the ontological claims that can be found in 
the Tractatus do not have any place in the Philosophical 
Investigations” and that “maybe Wittgenstein presents a radical 
alternative to this classical formulation and opens the way to 
a different strategy against relativism and skepticism”. I 
would like to make three comments on this.  
First, it is absolutely true that the later Wittgenstein 
rejects many of the realist assumptions of the Tractatus, but 
it is worth remembering that the early Wittgenstein embraces 
at the same time a solipsistic-transcendental conception 
which is at odds with Frege’s realism—the main objectivist 
influence upon the Tractatus. Therefore, the dividing line 
between early and later Wittgenstein cannot be simply 
interpreted as the transition from a realist to an anti-realist 
view given that the Tractarian framework already falls 
outside strict realism. 
Second, to associate the early and the later Wittgenstein 
to the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations respectively 
is to deny that On Certainty brings with it substantially new 
views and to admit that in the Investigations we find 
Wittgenstein’s last word on the problems of philosophy. I 
have criticized the idea of a “third” Wittgenstein because I 
am convinced that what Wittgenstein wrote in the last years 
of his life belongs to the Investigations project. But this does 
not mean, of course, that this project is essentially 
established in the posthumously published Investigations. 
Quite the contrary. There is evidence in Last Writings on the 
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Philosophy of Psychology and On Certainty that Wittgenstein was 
still working on the Investigations, a work that should include 
his ultimate ruminations on epistemic and psychological 
concepts.34 Some of the views articulated in these texts can 
be found in manuscripts dating from as early as 1932,35 
which supports my conviction that it is more appropriate to 
talk about an unfinished version of the Investigations rather 
than a “third” Wittgenstein. There are, however, significant 
novelties in Wittgenstein’s final writings, especially the 
manuscript sources of On Certainty, and what Description of 
Situations suggests is that at least up to a certain point the 
definitive picture that Wittgenstein left us appears as more 
realist than the Tractarian picture allegedly was.  
Carvalho cannot agree with this reading—and this is my 
third comment—because he takes the Investigations to 
constitute an actual turning-point in the history of 
philosophy doing away with “classical” attempts to solve its 
long-lasting problems. Does not Wittgenstein tell us that 
conceptual investigations are needed exactly to eradicate 
pseudo-questions which make us suppose that their answers 
lie in some ethereal place? Should not we abandon the 
essentialist quest for an objectivity which, after all, is a 
symptom of misunderstanding the practice of language 
where regularities are established by the practice itself? 
Wittgenstein definitely teaches us that many issues that 
characterize philosophical reflection are nonsense and that 
we need to dissolve them instead of searching for a solution. 
Yet there is a risk involved in this emancipation of 
philosophy, which consists of confounding the conceptual 
                                                     
34 On this subject, see Venturinha 2010, esp. 149-150. On the 
genesis of the Investigations, see Venturinha 2013. 
35 A survey of Wittgenstein’s engagement with the concepts of 
believing and knowing can be found in Venturinha forthcoming c. 
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investigation that can lead to a logical dissolution of the 
problem with the dogmatic eschew of that same problem. I 
read Wittgenstein as inviting us to carry out conceptual 
investigations in an undogmatic manner with the aim of 
dissolving those perennial questions that, under close 
scrutiny, do not obey the rules of our grammar.36 The fact 
that the formulations of these questions by philosophers are 
often nonsensical does not mean that there is nothing 
whatsoever in reality corresponding to them. Wittgenstein’s 
struggle against the problem of scepticism during his entire 
life shows that for him it represented much more than 
merely a linguistic construction and that the “hinges” he 
found can be seen as just a better epistemological answer to 
virtually the same issues we encounter throughout the 
history of philosophy. The realism proposed by Bolzano and 
Frege may be unsound, and the peculiar transcendentalisms 
of Husserl and the early Wittgenstein look even more 
untenable. I do not think, however, that we can stop playing, 
to use Carvalho’s words, “the game of searching for final 
epistemological justifications and ontological 
presuppositions”. I take this to be what Wittgenstein is doing 
in On Certainty within his innovative anti-foundationalism 
and infallibilism.  
 
 
REPLY TO CUTER        
 
Someone who has read João Vergílio Gallerani Cuter’s 
commentary but not my book will believe that Lewis’ 
rejection of the correspondence theory of truth plays a more 
important role in Description of Situations than it actually does. 
Lewis appears in chapter 3 alongside Bolzano and Frege as 
                                                     
36 I discuss the nature of conceptual investigations in Venturinha 
2020b. 
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reacting against the correspondence thesis held by authors 
such as Aquinas, Kant and the early Wittgenstein. All these 
conceptions of correspondence are different and so are the 
rejections. While Bolzano’s and Frege’s views can be seen as 
similar, Lewis stands somewhat apart. It was not my aim in 
Description of Situations to discuss the core of Lewis’ 
conception. As a matter of fact, I limit myself to write the 
following alluding to Lewis’ 2001 paper “Forget about the 
‘Correspondence Theory of Truth’”: 
 
Among contemporary critics of the 
“correspondence theory of truth” we find 
Lewis, for whom the theory that “truth is 
correspondence to fact” does not go any 
further than “the redundancy theory”, failing to 
challenge “the coherence and pragmatic and 
epistemic theories” […]. (2018, 20)  
 
What is at the centre of Cuter’s commentary is not so 
much this passage but something I say in chapter 2 (“What 
the World Is Made Of”) when I introduce the Tractarian 
notions of “fact” (Tatsache) and “state of affairs” (Sachverhalt). 
It is in this context that I quote a passage from Lewis, which 
I reproduce again here: 
 
A Tractarian fact is not a proposition. It is not 
something true that might have been false. 
Rather, it might have not existed at all. (2001, 
277)          
 
Lewis gives this definition of “Tractarian fact” after 
asserting that “we get nowhere if we stick to the usage on 
which a fact is nothing else but a true proposition” (ibid.). 
The result is then “the truthmaker principle”, according to 
which “for every true proposition there exists something 
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such that the existence of that thing implies (strictly? 
relevantly?) the proposition in question” (ibid.). 
It is here that the main disagreement between me and 
Cuter lies. On his view, “what Lewis calls a ‘Tractarian fact’ 
has nothing to do with the notion of ‘fact’ we find in the 
Tractatus”. Moreover, Cuter avows, “the Tractarian notion of 
correspondence is completely immune to Lewis’s criticisms” 
and “pace Nuno Venturinha, it does not involve any kind of 
relativism”. That what Lewis takes to be a “Tractarian fact” 
has or has not to do with what Wittgenstein calls “fact” in 
the Tractatus evidently depends on how we read this book. 
Lewis himself warns the reader that he does not “assume that 
a proponent of Tractarian facts must agree with all that 
Wittgenstein […] says about them” (ibid.). It is patently clear 
that Lewis is not interested in taking Wittgenstein at his 
word. But, with this proviso, I think we can still take 
“Tractarian facts” in a Lewisian way. In so doing, the 
Tractarian conception of Übereinstimmung will be in 
difficulties and can be regarded as involving a certain 
relativism. Alternatively, we can read the Tractatus as Cuter 
recommends and the troubles of correspondism and 
relativism will both vanish. Let me sketch what this reading 
involves, as I understand it.  
Cuter reads the Tractatus in a completely immanent way 
as there being no reference for our propositions other than 
what we can conceive as a possible denotation. This is for 
him the corollary of “the most radical conception of truth as 
‘correspondence’ that was ever formulated in the history of 
philosophy”. I have used the terms “reference” and 
“denotation” deliberately because Cuter seems to subscribe 
to Russell’s understanding of the Fregean distinction 
between “sense” (Sinn) and “reference” (Bedeutung) when 
Russell, rendering these terms as “meaning” and 
“denotation”, states that “denoting phrases never have any 
meaning in themselves” and that “there is no meaning, and 
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only sometimes a denotation” (1905, 480 and 483, fn. 3). 
Despite the strong influence of Russell upon the Tractatus, I 
am convinced that Frege did influence the early Wittgenstein 
even more and that Frege’s concept of Bedeutung is to be 
taken robustly, that is, in a realist manner. It is very 
significant that Wittgenstein, after affirming that a “case” or 
a “fact” corresponds to “the existence of states of affairs” 
(1961, 2), immediately makes clear at proposition 2.01 that 
the “state of affairs” is nothing more than “a combination of 
objects”, i.e. “things” (Sachen, Dingen). And at 3.203 he writes 
that an “object” is the Bedeutung of a “name”. I cannot give 
here all my reasons in favour of a Fregean interpretation of 
the Tractatus, but it is precisely the attention to Frege’s 
realism that prevents the book from falling totally, as Cuter 
reads it, “into the solipsist sphere of a transcendental subject 
which makes language my language, and the world my world”. 
While I recognize an ontological equilibrium in the Tractatus 
between the objectivity of the world and the 
transcendentality of the subject, which raises the problem of 
correspondence, Cuter’s reading undercuts this balance and 
consequently the relativism of correspondism. He claims 
that “the point of view of the transcendental subject is not 
relative to ‘this subject’ as opposed to any other” and that 
“[t]here is only one possible transcendental subject—only 
one possible source of sense”. When put this way, a 
Lewisian-style criticism of the Tractarian account of 
correspondence necessarily loses its point and with it the 
worries of relativism. However, this solution comes with the 
price of transforming the Tractatus into a “solipsist sphere”, 
one in which Wittgenstein, as I read him, has always tried not 
to be imprisoned. As a metaphysical realist, it is only natural 
for me to prefer the shortcomings of the Tractarian 
correspondence theory to an infallible solipsism. I am happy 
to know that Cuter does not trust that “the Tractarian notion 
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REPLY TO SILVA 
 
Marcos Silva’s commentary presents an interesting 
challenge to Description of Situations as it consists in connecting 
“hinge epistemology and social dependency in the 
construction of normativity” or, as he also puts it, “equating 
logic and hinge epistemology” within the framework of a 
contextualist approach. My primary interest in the book was 
epistemic contextualism, which deals with the truth-
conditions of sentences usually expressed in the form “S 
knows that p”. What divides contextualists and their (subject-
sensitive or insensitive) invariantist opponents are the 
criteria for establishing these truth-conditions. A fully-
fledged contextualist will argue that the attribution of 
knowledge to a certain subject S in a given context C at a 
time t can vary according to the epistemic group of the 
attributor. Knowledge would be thus a wholly relative 
concept and the epistemological inquiry should concentrate 
on whether the attribution is true in C from the attributor’s 
perspective. More specifically, it should focus on what can 
legitimately lead an attributor to ascribe knowledge to S in 
that situation. Reflecting on the norms of practical reasoning 
is therefore essential for any contextualist since the epistemic 
standards must be reasonably set. The question is different 
for a subject-sensitive invariantist because what matters in 
this case are the practical interests of S, what S needs to know 
in order to act in C. The norms of practical reasoning still 
apply here, of course, but they are envisaged from the 
subject’s point of view. The only one who can apparently 
dispense with such norms is the invariantist for whom 
knowledge rests on context-independent factors. In this 
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scenario, S knows or does not know, simpliciter. My appeal to 
a Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology in Description of 
Situations was meant exactly to clear up some confusion that 
subsists in the debate about contextualism and the possibility 
of knowledge. Let me briefly explain what this confusion is. 
While I evidently recognize that contexts are socially 
determined, I argue that it is a mistake to believe that they 
are exclusively social. Interestingly enough, this belief can be 
found not only among epistemic contextualists but also 
among many Wittgensteinians. They all share a common fear 
of ontological impositions and prefer to look at reality as a 
pure social construction. They seem willing to forego that we 
live in a physical world and that our contexts are subordinated 
to what nature allows us to do. To think about the universe 
as shaped by our laws is, to my mind, parochial in the sense 
that this standpoint theory disregards what reality in itself 
encompasses. It is indeed a natural consequence of 
anthropocentrism to lay all the emphasis on what we know 
about things rather than on the things themselves. I can 
imagine the anti-realist asking: “But how can you reach 
anything other than your own views about things?” And this 
is not, for sure, the right question to ask. If it were so, 
scientists would never have sought beyond their knowledge 
and could never have arrived at new discoveries—of what 
was standing there waiting to be known by them. Yet what 
do hinges and normativity have to do with this?                    
There are two ways of conceiving hinges. One way is to 
take them to be social constructs, something we hold fast to 
as the result of our cultural, religious or scientific 
development and that is subject to change over time. For the 
anti-realist, these are the only hinges that exist and their 
normative character will always be a question of debate. But 
there is another way of looking at the matter, by which the 
former subsist with a more profound type of hinges. They 
have not been established by us on the basis of more or less 
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reasonable agreements. On the contrary, they are the actual 
conditions for the establishment of any hinges of the first 
type. Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, as I read it, makes room for 
both in allowing a distinction between what Pritchard calls 
“personal hinge propositions”, which are the outcome of our 
revisable “personal hinge commitments”, and “über hinge 
propositions”, which turn on fixed “über hinge 
commitments” (2016, 95-97). It is in the latter—and clearly 
not in the former, as Wittgensteinian contextualists 
defend—that we find the most solid basis against radical 
scepticism. 
If we read On Certainty along these lines, Silva’s suggestion 
of a “social perspective” in the midst of which “[t]ruth is 
established by persuasion resulting from the steps justified 
by public rules and not by an eminent transcendent truth of 
our practices” would be only relevant to the “personal” 
hinges. On the other hand, his claim that “[i]n a contextualist 
view, a realist approach to logic should be avoided as it 
blocks any revision of logic and prevents the emergence of a 
greater plurality of non-classical logics with different aims, 
scopes and applicability” must be read with caution. The 
admission of “über hinge commitments”, which are 
“arational hinge commitments” (Pritchard 2016, 69, 89, 102-
103, 174-175), should not rule out that our more basic logical 
principles can evolve accompanying the evolution of things 
in general. This, however, would be something quite 
extraordinary and cannot be confounded with the 
predictable revision of normative principles proper to our 
“personal commitments”. Wittgenstein himself has some 
remarks in On Certainty that point in the direction of what I 
have called “an evolutionary normativity”, which “goes side 
by side with the static principles of thought thereby creating 
a real logic” (Venturinha 2015, 165). If I am right in my 
supposition, then we will not need to say, like Silva, that “we 
are not talking about facts and truth, but about our criteria 
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REPLY TO DALL’AGNOL 
 
The main objection posed by Darlei Dall’Agnol in his 
commentary is an expected one: how can I claim, after 
defending an epistemological objectivism throughout 11 
chapters of Description of Situations, that there is no moral 
knowledge? This incongruence seems even more flagrant if 
one takes into consideration that I forcefully defend in the 
book the existence of hinge commitments that go beyond 
mere convention. So, there should be a way to conceive of 
moral hinges, as Dall’Agnol points out. But whereas in the 
theoretical sphere we seem bound to accept hinge 
propositions like “There are two hands writing this sentence 
on the keyboard” or “The world did not begin when I took 
my coffee this morning”, in the practical sphere we are less 
constrained. As I explain in the book, even a moral principle 
such as “you shall not kill”, which we would like to be 
universally accepted, comes with a list of possible exceptions. 
You shall not kill unless you kill in self-defence or you kill an 
animal for subsistence consumption, etc. The objectivity of 
the principle thus appears as a mere conventionalized norm 
that, like any other norm, can be broken in some situations. 
Contextualism assumes here a decisive role because whether 
or not the agent is allowed to break the norms depends on 
very specific factors of the context in which she is. For this 
reason, reasonable standards must be set to regulate our 
practice in society. Similarly to what epistemic contextualists 
suggest about sentences of the form “S knows that p”, in 
regard to which someone can attribute knowledge to S and 
someone else can deny it without incurring any contradiction 
by employing different standards, there are cases in which 
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someone can consider that S did the right thing whereas 
someone else can think that S was unjustified in acting as she 
did. We encounter debates of this kind everywhere and every 
time. 
It is in order to avoid moral relativism, as the natural 
consequence of a moral contextualism, that I introduce in 
Description of Situations what I call the “Disclosure Principle”. 
As Dall’Agnol summarizes it so well, “[t]his thought 
experiment makes clear that moral responsibility is an 
inalienable feature of our existence and that our moral 
conscience speaks to us because everything could become 
known to our dearest”. If you like, one can say that the 
“Disclosure Principle” is a subject-sensitive invariantist 
principle insofar as what fuels it lies in the agent’s projections 
for her life when she is situated in a given context. As in 
subject-sensitive invariantism, it is the subject’s—viz. the 
agent’s—practical interests that will determine what she calls 
knowledge—viz. what she calls moral knowledge. Is this 
another form of relativism? I think it is the best we can arrive 
at in this domain. Note that I do not place the decision of 
what is morally right or wrong in the attributor, as a typical 
moral contextualist will do, for this takes the focus out of 
moral conscience. In the end, morality would be regulated 
by what society imposes on us. I reject that this is the right 
way of approaching the issue. But the promise of a moral 
invariantism, insensitive to context, which could lay down 
objective principles for action, seems to me vain. It would 
not take account of the circumstances in which we act nor 
of the freedom we have to make our own decisions. Contrary 
to the existence of my hands or the subsistence of the world, 
in which my will does not interfere, the nature of morality is 
found precisely in the agent’s free will to do r or w. 
Dall’Agnol’s suggestion of a Wittgensteinian “practical 
cognitivism”, which “asserts that there is moral knowledge 
and that it is best understood as involving knowing-how to 
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act”, can obviously work within a subject-sensitive 
invariantist framework. It is, from my point of view, 
absolutely sound. But it inevitably lacks, when seen from an 
epistemological standpoint, the certainty regarding the 
outcome of the action which it would be necessary to achieve 
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